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For many years, scholarship covering the Napoleonic
satellite kingdoms has centered on the overriding presence
of Napoleon Bonaparte without looking a great deal at the
kingdoms that supported him.

Since the recent publication

of Stuart Woolf's Napoleon's Integration of Europe the focus
of study on these satellite kingdoms will change.

Bavaria's

history in particular needs to be examined, especially since
a clear study will reveal much of Bavaria's modernization
during these years was already underway before Napoleon
assimilated it into his empire.

However, much of that

progressive policy would not have been enacted without
Napoleon's protection.
This project therefore will represent an attempt to
show that the reform policies of Maximilian von Montgelas
and his lord, Max Joseph of Bavaria, were well underway
before the advent of the Confederation of the Rhine, that
Napoleon's dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire was

paramount to the success of Montgelas' policy, and that
Bavaria's zeal for reform was tightly bound up with a new
upper-middle class and was not a German nationalist movement
as later historians have assumed.

The answers to these

questions will reveal much about the nature of reform and
modernization in the German minor states and that the
intellectuals of the early 19th Century had much less to do
with these movements than is generally believed.
This project will rest on primary sources from the
1799-1815 period, primarily Montgelas' memoirs and much of
the enormous material left by Napoleon Bonaparte and his
ministers.

Whenever secondary sources are used it will be

the intent of the author to utilize primary quotations from
within those texts as much as possible.
In the end, it will be seen that the "revolution" in
Bavaria owed much to Napoleon but not its existence.
Likewise it will be clearly seen that these reforms were
undertaken by bureaucrats and not on the whole by the
supporters of German romantic philosophers, and that
Bavaria's allegiance was entirely local and had very little
to do with any drive for German unification.

INTRODUCTION

"Quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam
fama potentiae non sua vi nixa."
--Machiavelli1
It was neither sudden nor deliberate, yet, influenced
by the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the coming
of industrial power, there arose in late 18th-century
Germany a desire to remake the German political landscape.
A revolution of thought, at times scarcely evident to
contemporaries, initiated Germany's movement toward eventual
unification.

The first signs of change were evident during

the reigns of Frederick the Great of Prussia and Joseph II
of Austria, enlightened absolutists who desired to modernize
their state, to do away with irregular political borders,
outmoded allegiances and institutions regulared by the Holy
Roman Empire, the antiquated Reich.

By the time of the

French Revolution, a modern novus homo arose--bureaucrats,
advisors, diplomats, and businessmen who espoused liberal
modifications to the existing body politique.
The Holy Roman Empire had been growing weaker since
1648, and the 18th Century presented men of ability with the
opportunity to crusade for a new government.
response differed from state to state.

7

Popular

Prussia, moving

"That nothing is so weak or unstable as a reputation
for power that is not based on one's own forces." Niccolo
Machiavelli quoting Tacitus, The Prince, (London: Penguin
Books, 1961) 87.
1

2

toward dominance in German affairs, readily embraced the
"new man," utilizing the skills of such reformers in
administrative posts.

Austria, the conservative bulwark and

champion of Holy Roman affairs, was less enthusiastic about
the desires of such a class.

In the minor states, however,

these leaders would fundamentally and permanently alter the
official order.

They represented the political heart of the

Aufklarung (Enlightenment), a drive for the removal of
feudal ties and the superfluous institutions of Holy Roman
Empire, the development of a bureaucratic state, and, in the
south, the removal of the Catholic hegemony.
Foremost in this revolt was the Electorate of Bavaria,
fostered by her pro-French Elector, Maximilian Joseph IV of
the House of Witteslbach and Pfalz-Zweibriicken, and led by a
Savoyard minister, Max Joseph von Montgelas, the Elector's
closest advisor.

Assembling an ambitious group of

reformers, Montgelas would assault the status quo with the
tacit approval of his liege.

Their designs were twofold: to

modernize the Bavarian government and to assume a more
powerful position in European affairs.

Bavaria's social and

economic circumstances created the need for reform.
country languished in feudal petrification.

The

Finances were

ruined by years of ineffective rule by nobles and clergy.
Typical of European markets in those years, the economy
rested on the twin pillars of agriculture and textiles.
Neither received the attention they required from the
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existing government, and both were burdened with outdated
techniques and a Catholic refusal to allow more progressive
Protestant entrepreneurs into the state.

Montgelas' group

wanted a complete renovation of the government and a
reformation of church-state and church-society relations.
Their capstones were advancement and recognition by merit.
If a modern government could become a reality, then perhaps
their second goal would be achieved, to rescue Bavaria from
the international morass in which she was mired.
Time and again in European history certain nations have
been relegated to "second-class" powers.

Bereft of the

diplomatic, military, and economic power of the Great
Powers, these states were rendered subservient and dependent
on those nations which attempted mastery of the continent.
The quintessential "second-class" power, Bavaria greatly
desired to be her own master in European affairs.

She had

long played the pawn of foreign powers, especially in
conflicts between Austria and France.

Unable to muster the

resources or reputation to influence the other powers,
Bavaria's history is nonetheless a long struggle for
legitimacy and for power based on her own internal
stability, aggressive economy, modern government, and
military force.
The manner in which Bavaria accomplished this
modernization on her own has been debated by contemporaries
and historians.

Daniel Klang opens his article "Bavaria and
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the War of Liberation" with a discussion of Baron Stein's
September 1809 letter to the German nationalist Friedrich
von Gentz in which he declared his opinion that Prussia and
all of Germany would prevail over Emperor Napoleon I and his
Grande Armee.

With Napoleon's fall, the petty princes of

those minor states revolving about the French sun like
mindless satellites would find their support and thus their
legitimacy destroyed.

According to Stein the French-

dominated Confederation of the Rhine was a paper tiger that
lived or died according to the whims and successes of its
French master.

This prevalent view, Klang went on to say,

dominated the histories of the period written up to about
World War Two.2

Since that time, however, a historiographic

reaction has occurred.

Recent works, mostly by European

scholars, posited that Bavaria's actions represented a grass
roots movement among German reformers which would have
occurred without outside influence.

To whom the credit

should go for the varied successes of reform, however, is
blurred by the impact of the Napoleonic Wars and the massive
social and political changes of that time.

In the light of

such recent works as Stuart Woolf's magnificent Napoleon and
the Integration of Europe, the idea that Bavaria needed
assistance for her reforms to succeed needs to be qualified.
The issue of how Bavaria became a modern state and to

2

Daniel Klang, "Bavaria and the War of Liberation,
1813-1814," French Historical Studies, vol. 4, 1965, 22-24.

5

whom the credit goes is not a clear case.

Montgelas and his

lord of course deserve great commendation, though the
ambitious minister is certainly not renowned in his own land
today.3

To their list of successes can be attributed the

new bureaucratic administration, a reformed education
system, a French-inspired but not French-initiated
Constitution, and a program of fairly successful religious
toleration, the cornerstone of the minister's reform.

What

they could not achieve on their own was the destruction of
the Holy Roman Empire, which meant the Imperial circles, the
Reichsritterschaft, and, most importantly, the Imperial free
cities;

the reform of the Bavarian army into a mobile,

operational body capable of suceeding on the modern
battlefield;

the complete reorganization in geographic

terms of Bavarian domains and their consolidation into one
contiguous state;

and, of course, a degree of legitimacy

and strength in international affairs.
In many aspects Montgelas' policy represented a
successful revolt rather than a revolution.

Missing was the

crucial aspect of popular support of the masses, who instead
showed overtly passive indifference to the changes in their
land.

However, true to the revolutionary rule of measure

established by Crane Brinton in his magisterial The Anatomy

3

"He was the friend of Germany's enemy and the enemy of
Germany's religion," Klang, "Bavaria and the War of
Liberation," 26. Klang notes that no prominent streets,
parks, or government buildings bear Montgelas' name.
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of Revolution, it was the disgruntled upper middle class who
led the charge.

The obstacles were great and, though the

liberal leaders sometimes failed to act decisively, on the
whole their work was a success.

Indeed, the new Kingdom of

Bavaria, which successfully if narrowly survived the tumult
of the War of Liberation and the difficult beginnings of the
German Confederation led by Prince Metternich after the
Congress of Vienna, bore little resemblance to the backward
electorate in the last years of the eighteenth century.

The

most remarkable achievement was perhaps the modern
bureaucracy based upon advancement by merit.

Yet if it is

to be classified as a revolution it was an incomplete one,
much more of a government and ecclesiastical reformation.
The change was not complete;
affair.

neither was it a democratic

But change it was, and the impact was not lost on

the affairs of Germany during the next few decades.

"If we

judge them by what they promised," writes James Sheehan,
...Montgelas, Reitzenstein, and the rest appear to
be no more than qualified successes, but when we bear
in mind their slender resources, the pressures imposed
upon them from abroad, and the opposition they faced at
home, the scope and significance of their achievements
seem impressive.4
The timing of this change was auspicious.

Carried

eastward by French bayonets, the ideas of liberte,
fraternite, and egalite met with approval by the bureaucrats

4

Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989) 273.
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in the burdened Mittelstaaten. Certain aspects of
Montgelas' program would have gone forward without the
French Revolution.

Elimination of the church's temporal

power, deeply embedded in the beliefs and practices of the
citizens through Catholic control of education, stood as a
major internal barrier to reform, one which could not
removed without external help.

be

Some elements of land

reform, such as the removal of the outdated tax system,
could be enacted by a purely domestic policy.

Justice,

education, industry, and most importantly administration
could have been improved within the borders of the
electorate without fear of external interference.
Nonetheless, Bavaria needed France, for more than simple
support against hungry Austria, ever desirous of annexing
Wittelsbach domains.

No, the dreams of Max Joseph and

Montgelas became reality only after the rise of Napoleon
Bonaparte.
Napoleon forced metamorphosis not only in domains under
his immediate control but also in allied states.

The

changes introduced by the French conqueror allowed Montgelas
greater potential for change.

The liquidation of the Holy

Roman Empire and its strangling system of obligations
removed many obstacles.

Acting as a catalyst for further

action, it broadened the scope of Montgelas' administration.
Church lands belonging to untouchable orders, such as the
Teutonic Order or the Knights of Malta, suddenly lost

8

crucial foreign support, facilitating their confiscation by
the Bavarian government.

Imperial cities, islands of

political disobedience and monuments to the lingering
durability of the Reich, lost their legitimacy, as did the
Reichsritterschaft, the Imperial nobility, but neither could
be dealt with succesfully without Napoleonic influence.
Thus Napoleon's role in the Bavarian reforms needs
reevaluation.

To be sure, military and economic demands by

the French empire would ensure a degree of modification.
The Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon's great eastern
buffer of twenty-three major and minor states, would impose
certain obligations, most of them martial in nature.

The

Code Napoleon would be put into effect with varying success,
but Bavaria, like Baden, Wiirrtemberg, and Saxony, was
allowed a great deal of leeway in governing its own affairs.
Of great importance would be the Continental System enacted
to stagnate the British economy.

The ramifications of

Napoleon's economic war would effect Bavaria more than
Montgelas' own fiscal arrangements.
In addition, it must be recalled that not all of these
achievements came as a result of conscious action.

1813 and

the dilemma Napoleon's defeat presented to French-allied
Bavaria illustrates this well.

Max Joseph's regime had

associated itself with Napoleon in the first place as a
course of necessity, demanded by French dominance, the
encroachment of Austria, and Bavaria's inability to make

9

itself a first rate power.

The War of Liberation presented

a new problem, namely that the French conqueror was about to
suffer defeat.

Montgelas displayed impotence during the

dilemma and only through the machinations of the Francophobe
General Wrede and the policy of Prince Metternich did
Bavaria forego a restoration.

Royal policy certainly did

not call for the realignment; it simply occurred.
Montgelas' work offered the country a new international
legitimacy.

The state that emerged after the Congress of

Vienna was not the one envisioned by Max Joseph and his
ministers, but it would survive.
So, the Kingdom of Bavaria, as it existed in 1815 at
the close of the Napoleonic Period, owed its development to
the ambitions of the new "nobility," the willingness of its
monarch, the courage and determination of the Savoyard
minister, and the indirect influence of Napoleon Bonaparte,
his victories and defeats.

Stein's accusations that Bavaria

owed its existence to France, seconded by Heinrich von
Trietschke's historical attack later that century,

was not

accurate, but neither did Bavaria do it all alone.

The

truth, as in many things, lies somewhere in between.
There are dangers in establishing convenient
chronological classification focusing on short periods of
time.

Nonetheless, to explain this initial stage of German

"proto-nationalism," it is necessary to divide the reform
movement in Bavaria into three distinct parts: 1799-1805,
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the electoral period, 1805-1812, the royal period, and 18121818, the reaction period and the War of Liberation.

The

latter period is outside the scope of this study, but the
first two encompass the zenith of Montgelas' reform policy.
The electoral period is characterized by massive and
disorganized reforms and by external political affairs which
involved two wars, the disentigration of the Holy Roman
Empire, and the maturation of Napoleonic military dominance.
The royal period is marked by more reserved and careful
reform, a complete codification of those reforms, and the
integration of Bavaria as the largest of the Napoleonic
allied states.

Both periods show Bavaria's inability to

exercise relative independent action but also the
establishment of a solid government system which allowed her
to be the last German minor state to maintain her
independence in the 19th Century.

Chapter 1
Bavaria before the accession of Max Joseph IV

In those days, princes were not overworked mortals
as they are today. Their crowns sat very firmly on
their heads, and at night they just drew their
nightcaps over them, and slept in peace, while
peacefully at their feet slept their peoples; and when
these woke up in the morning they said 'Good morning,
Father,' and the princes replied, 'Good morning, dear
children.'
--Heinrich Heine1

I
The Holy Roman Empire

In order to fully understand the extent of the
successes and failures of Max Joseph's administration in
reforming the Bavarian state,

an overview of that which was

to be overthrown is necessary.

The Holy Roman Empire,

outmoded and decayed though it was, stood at the heart of
the matter.

Years of increasing princely authority,

enlightened thought, and bloody conflict sapped the vitality
of the Germanic body.

Changes in the very definition of

European nationhood crippled the empire's ability to operate
in the arena of international affairs.

Since the Wars of

Louis XIV, the modern state dominated European diplomacy,
and the Holy Roman Empire was anything but a state.
no true center, capital, or focus of unity.

It had

Sovereignty,

'Heinrich Heine on the Holy Roman Empire, quoted in
Jean d'Arenberg, The Lesser Princes of the Holy Roman
Empire in the Napoleonic Era, dissertation, (Washington
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1950) 197.
11
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absolutist or enlightened, did not reside in a single person
or office.

Therefore, there could be no centralized

position of strength from which the Empire could negotiate.
Immutable, diverse opinions in law, justice, education, and
military service sundered the councils which assisted the
Emperor and the legislative bodies.

The various member

states, numbering over two hundred, were subjected to
irregular boundaries and overlapping jurisdiction on the
Imperial and local levels.

In addition, the smaller rulers

refused to follow the Emperor's lead.

Thus, loyalty to the

Reich was measured in partisan aspirations.
The "constitution" of the Holy Roman Empire provided
for the flawed foundation of the Reich.

This constitution

was in reality a conglomeration of policies, traditions,
edicts, and negotiated settlements. It combined medieval
caesaropapism, which no longer applied in many kingdoms of
the Reich, with Germanic concepts of authority and
submission.

The "constitution" included such documents as

the Golden Bull of 1356 (establishing the largely defunct
electoral system), the Eternal Peace of 1495,

the Treaty of

Passau (1552), the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the allimportant Peace of Westphalia (1648).2

The de facto law of

the Reich was also burdened by other less famous Imperial

2

John Gagliardo, Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman
Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763-1806, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1980) 16.
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proclamations, Papal Bulls, and local decrees.

This

ramshackle constitution was incapable of adapting to new
forces unleashed by the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution.

The inconsistencies and peculiar ideas defy

easy historical summary and make comparisons with other
states difficult if not meaningless.

Ideas concerning the

rights of the sovereign, his ties over the land, and the
multifaceted legislation to which they were nominally linked
were peculiar to Germanic law and cannot be easily
translated.

Embedded within the political ideology of the

constitution and the Empire was the venerated concept of
Herrschaft, defined by Otto Brunner as a type of authority
combining political, economic, and social powers, embodied
in the various political territories (Land or Lander) of the
Reich,
herr.

an authority located in the person of the lord, or
Such power belonged to each sovereign and was

considered to allow absolute command over the citizens,
resources, and wealth of the Land.3 From the Imperial
throne to each duke or baron, herrschaft defined his
absolute authority inside his own realm, at least in theory.
The greatest herr, again in theory, was the Reichsoberhaupt,
the Holy Roman Emperor.

3

Sheehan, Germany, 25; Otto Brunner, Land and
Lordship: Structure of Government in Medieval Austria, 4th
edition, (trans, from Land und Herrschaft by H. Kaminsky and
James V.H. Melton), (Philadelphia: University of
Philadelphia Press, 1984) 365-368.
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Though his power was greatly curtailed, as head of the
diverse institutions of the Reich the emperor still
maintained some say over the procedures of the empire,
usually with dubious effect.

Between the years 1438-1805,

the Austrian House of Hapsburg dominated the position.

At

the time of the French Revolution, the powers of the emperor
remained largely feudal and increasingly weak.

Income for

the Holy Roman coffers originated from gifts at coronation,
fines from the Imperial courts, taxes from the Imperial free
cities, and payment for noble titles and feudal assessments.
As John Gagliardo notes, the emperor was forced to depend
upon his hereditary lands for necessary income. The
disastrous, ephemeral reign of the single non-Hapsburg
Emperor, the Wittelsbach Charles VII of Bavaria (1742-1745),
markedly shows the weakness of this arrangement.

Charles

attempted a vast reorganization of the Holy Roman Empire,
but Bavarian coffers were insufficient for the task and the
attempt failed miserably.4

Intense partisan pressure from

constituent states often led some emperors, such as the
ambitious Joseph II of Austria, to consider giving up the
crown altogether, since many Imperial responsibilities ran
contrary to the interests of Austria itself.5

4

Gagliardo, Reich and Nation,

5

Sheehan,

Germany, 16.

20-21.
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The institutions through which the emperor could wield
his ungainly and diminishing power remained ponderously slow
and complex.

The official legislative body of the Holy

Roman Empire,

the Reichstag, was convoked only by the

emperor.

Its motto,

"Reichsrecht brecht Landesrecht,"6 was

only rarely true by the time of the French Revolution.

In

fact, this body, though convened in Regensburg in the
"Eternal Diet" (1663-1806), was, like the Reichsoberhaupt,
hardly more than symbolic.

Whatever vestiges of power it

retained were hindered by its breakup into three maladroit
councils,

that of the Electors (Kurfurstenrat), the Princes

(Furstenrat), and the Cities.

The Kurfurstenrat, the only

one to meet on a regular basis, consisted of the seven
regular Imperial electors and was chaired by the ArchChancellor of the Empire, the elector of Mainz.

It

consulted with the emperor and was responsible for his
election. Wayward interests on the part of the members
curtailed the group's effectiveness.

Instead of personally

attending, the emperor frequently sent his prinzipalkommisar
and the electors sent envoys.7

The particular interests of

the members often conflicted, making consensus an impossible
goal.

Local desires dominated; Imperial needs became

secondary.

Important decisions were argued by

6

Literally "Imperial law breaks territorial law."

7

Gagliardo, Reich, 22-23.
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plenipotentiaries who cared more for their rank than for the
issues which that rank allowed them to debate.

Ambassadors

entrenched themselves in local interests, sacrificing dying
tradition for territorial freedom.
A loose juridic system existed, but it too suffered
from years of neglect.

Two large Imperial councils served

the emperor himself, the Imperial Cameral Tribunal,
burdened in 1780 by over 60,000 backlogged cases,8 and the
Aulic Council (Reichshofrat). The latter consisted of
herrenbank (nobles) members of the gelehrtenbank, the legal
community of the Reich.

Intelligent, educated, made up of

members of the most important noble families, the Aulic
Council commanded respect despite its rather vague duties.
The council largely replaced the Kurfurstenrat as the
emperor's personal advisory body in the late 1700's,
performing many legislative and administrative tasks in
addition to hearing appeals from lower courts and the
Imperial Diet.

If, as James Sheehan proposes, all that

remained of the empire was pomp and circumstance, a rigid
adherence to symbolism which has been a time honored
tradition among the Volk, the Aulic Council stood as the
last bastion of Germanic belief in the Holy Roman Empire.9

s

Ibid., 27.

9

Sheehan, Germany, 18.
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Existing political boundaries complicated the
administration of the Reich.

Due to Germany's patchwork

geography, a duchy would frequently overlap a neighboring
barony, with some territory belonging to one herr completely
surrounded by lands belonging to another.

Imperial

administrative districts, the eight Reichskreise or Imperial
circles, combining legal, administrative, and financial
aspects, along with medieval military commitments,
complicated the existence of the Empire to the point of
making any decisions of the Imperial government impossible
to uphold.

These circles held little or no resemblance to

the geographical polities of Germany.
laws.

Each had their own

Not only, then, would a duke find a town under his

rule completely engulfed by lands of his neighbor but also
his town may well have been included in an entirely
different kreise, involving a completely new set of laws and
codes by which he must adhere. Often such towns would carry
on their own business, either heedless of the lord's wishes
or ignored by him.

Thus, from the top to the bottom,

through law to geography, the Holy Roman Empire so chided by
the caustic Voltaire was bereft of all physical substance.
"Imperial institutions," wrote Sheehan, "were a labyrinth of
overlapping jurisdictions and special privileges: they had
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no well-defined center, just as the Reich itself had neither
a capital nor a single source of sovereignty."10
However, despite the fact that the Germanic body was
unwieldy and outdated, the political symbols of the Holy
Roman Empire remained important to certain elements which
stood in the way of progress.

Ancient institutions

contained one viable characteristic, one reason for the
continuation of the existence of the Reich: sanctuary.

The

old nobility, the conservative order which had so much to
lose from the threatening tide from France, held onto its
highly symbolic institutions far after they had become
politically impotent.

These were the only strongholds

remaining to those who held dear, for personal reasons, the
symbolism of the Reich.
Two imperial traditions most deplored by ambitious
minor states were the group of nobles known as the
Reichsritterschaft, the Imperial knights, and the Imperial
free cities.

Noble families long ensconced in the network

of the ancien regime,

the knights included many landless

barons and counts and in some instances owners of large
tracts of land.

The Reichsritterschaft found its greatest

strength in the Protestants of the north.

Split into three

geographical groups, Bavaria belonged to two of these.

The

Franconian and Swabian knights numbered 360,000, owning 688

10

Ibid. , 15.
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estates in Swabia and 702 in Franconia, thus making up a
sizable portion of the population.11
The fifty-one Imperial free cities attempted to make
themselves an exclusive group, exercising vigorous laws to
decide just who could live within their boundaries.

Though

they remained one of the emperor's only taxable citizenry,
the rights and favors enjoyed by these cities far outweighed
the responsibilities.

They answered directly to the Aulic

Council or the emperor and had greater leeway in regards to
law and military service.

The emperor considered the

Reichsritterschaft and the Free Cities as his personal
nobility, giving his empire, as it were, a certain
viability.
the empire.

Both would hold fast to the lingering embers of
Combined assaults by eager minor states and the

burgeoning Napoleonic Empire would finally destroy them.
Perhaps only the vague concept of nationalism, a
nascent movement directed by loyalty to one's own state,
could possibly have given the Holy Roman Empire the
legitimacy it needed to stand the test.

But the Holy Roman

Empire was not true state, a prerequisite for the growth of
nationality.

Institutions and symbols did not suffice.

In

addition, the early reform movements exhibited more loyalty
to the local prince than loyalty to Germany as a whole.
time of Bismarck, when for the first time many Germans

n

d'Arenberg,

Lesser Princes, 14, 81-82.

The
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thought of their state as a true embodiment of the Germanic
spirit, was still far in the future.

As it was, the growing

loyalty representing the earliest forms of German
nationalism, as expressed by Montgelas for Bavaria and
Reitzenstein for Wiirttemberg, would be a primary factor in
dismantling the Empire.

Similar loyalties could not be

fostered within the ancient institutions.

Bavarians could

no more want to be members of the Reich than members of
"Germany." For the time, they were simply Bavarians, though
proud of their German ancestry, just as Wurttembergers were
from Wurttemberg and Saxons from Saxony.

The Holy Roman

Empire did not hold sufficient liberties nor efficient
enough government to hold the loyalty of the German people.
Because of this weakness, the Reich proved easy prey to
Napoleonic imperialism.12

12

H.A.L. Fisher, Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship:
Germany, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903) 7-8; Heinrich von
Treitschke, History of Germany in the 19th-century, 6 vols.
(New York: AMS Press, 1968) 1:250- Michael Hughes states
that the empire acted as an inhibitor to nationalism, the
only thing that could, theoretically, save it. See Hughes,
Nationalism and Society, (London: Edward Arnold, 1988) 2931.
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II
Bavaria before 1799

Bavaria, as the third largest German state, stood much
to gain from any possibility of change.

The herrschaft over

Bavaria belonged to the House of Wittelsbach, the twelfth
ancient family of the Holy Roman Empire, founded in 1180. In
1799, the electorate proper was, like many other German
dominions, divided up into parcels of unequal size.
Comprising nearly 1,2 00 of Germany's 12,000 square miles,
Bavaria was the largest of the mittelstaaten.

It contained

around 2.1 million inhabitants, one-sixth of Germany's
total.

Bavaria as a political entity included Upper and

Lower Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate in the Danube valley,
the detached possessions of the Rhine Palatinate, and the
Duchies of Zweibriicken, Jiilich, and Berg.

The Wittelsbachs

controlled both the Bavarian electorate and the Electorate
of the Palatinate.13

Astride the primary military route for

contending Austrian and French forces, Bavaria frequently
found itself a battleground.

13

The electorate's geographical

Maximilian Joseph Graf en von Montgelas,
Denwiirdigkeiten des Graf en Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas
uber die innere Staatsverwaltung Bayerns (1799-1817) (In
French as Compte Rendu), (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche
Verlagsbuchhanlung, 1908) 27-28. Montgelas' memoirs are
contained in two works, the first covering foreign policy
and the second concerning domestic policy. To avoid
confusion, the second work will be referred to hereafter as
Compte Rendu; C.P. Higby, The Ecclesiastical Policy, 1421. See also W.R. Lee, Population Growth, Economic
Development, and Social Change in Bavaria, 1750-1850, (New
York:Arno Press, 1977) 12.
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position at the head of the Upper Danube gave armies access
both to the Danube Valley and the Vienna region, the heart
of the Hapsburg lands,

but also parts of Upper Germany and,

to the west, the upper Rhine River and Palatinate.

Thus, as

C.T. Atkinson declared, Bavaria could be "either Austria's
stoutest bulwark or the most useful ally to her enemies."14
The history of Bavarian foreign policy illustrates this
point.

Wittelsbach rulers carefully negotiated the line

between the perils of independence and the incapacitation of
foreign domination.

The desire of the House of Hapsburg-

Lorraine, ruling from nearby Vienna, to annex the Bavarian
lands is well-documented.

On several occasions since the

Treaty of Westphalia the Austrians tried to bring Bavarian
lands under their control, seeking to augment the German
speaking majority in Austrian territory and intensifying
their involvement in German affairs.

Bavarian rulers

traditionally utilized alliances with France as protection
against their powerful neighbors down the Danube Valley.
Starting with Elector Max Emmanuel (1679-1726) and the War
of the Spanish Succession, the 18th Century saw frequent
treaties and alliances between the Bourbon nation and
Bavaria.

14

This "friendship" was strained at times,

C.T. Atkinson, A History of Germany, 1715-1815, (New
York: Barnes & Noble, 1969) 3 64. Paul Bernard notes
astutely that in the campaigns of 1703 and 1741 it was from
Bavaria that Austria had been invaded. See Paul Bernard,
Joseph II and Bavaria: Two 18th-century Attempts at German
Unification, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).
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especially when Austria offered France its agriculturally
wealthy and densely populated possessions in the Netherlands
in return for the Bourbon's official nod on the annexation
of Bavarian lands.15
The jumbled lands under Bavarian authority were divided
first into Rentamer, or Regierungen. These administrative
districts were further subdivided into Pfleggerichte, which
normally did not include cities, monasteries, or the lands
belonging to nobles or knights.

This arrangement made each

Pfleggerichte irregular in shape, often completely engulfing
cities and towns.

The magistrate, or pfleger, was

responsible for the levying of taxes, meting out justice,
and policing his small sub-district.

The government set

their incomes at 1500 gulden per year, but their tax-levying
ability allowed them to draw much more through graft.

The

electoral government had the theoretical power of assigning
deputations to look for abuses, but the existing replacement
system for the pfleggerichte made conviction improbable,

ls

Ibid. , 25, 45-46, 121-127, 310, 438-439; Gagliardo,
Reich and Nation, 69-71; On French-Austrian negotiations to
exchange territory during the French Revolution, see Sydney
Seymour Biro, The German Policy of Revolutionary France,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). Bavaria
frequently looked to the Hohenzollerns of Prussia for
support as well, causing alarm in France and Austria over
the idea of a joint Hohenzollern-Wittelsbach domination of
the Holy Roman Empire.
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because the outgoing magistrate appointed a successor, who
in turn was responsible for his prosecution.16
Coupled with the economic limitations and the
ineffective government was the Roman Catholic Church.
Though the Reformation and the Thirty-Years War had done
much to reduce the power of the Holy See in many corners of
Germany, here, in the south, the Catholic church stood as a
great edifice of conservatism, the symbol of the status quo.
The ascendancy of the Catholic church remained as strong as
in the time of Martin Luther.

Indeed, in 1782 the ex-Jesuit

Papal nuncio Cramer declared to the Pope that heretics had
slipped into every part of Germany save Bavaria.17

Cramer

went so far as to declare Munich a "German Rome."18

Each

bishopric had its own rules concerning the education of the
populace and the jurisdiction by which certain crimes would
be adjudicated.

A traveller in Bavaria declared "...he who

could see things as they are, and would trace every intrigue
back to its origin would find the first moves of the machine
in a monk's cowl or a petticoat."19

Montgelas recalled

16

Higby, The Religious Policy, 30-32; Montgelas,
Compte Rendu, 13-14. Some pfleger were Imperial Knights,
doubling their protection from removal.
17

Higby, The Religious Policy, 34.

18

Harold C. Vedeler, "The Genesis of the Toleration
Reforms in Bavaria under Montgelas," The Journal of Modern
History, vol. X, no. 4, Dec, 1938, 474.
19

J.K.Riesbeck, quoted in Higby, The Religious Policy,

474 .
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Lors de l'avenement de votre majestie la religion
catholique etoit exclusivement dominante dans les
duches de Baviere, de Neubourg, du Haut-Palatinat, les
possessions de la maison palatine en Souabe. C'etoit
la seule dont l'exercice public fut autorise, dont les
membres pussent exercer des emplois.20
Various portions of Bavarian land fell under the
boundaries of nine different diocese, none fully within the
electorate.

The Catholic clergy numbered 3,179 secular and

3 700 parochial,

discounting the great number of supplicants

and monastics in the many monasteries and abbeys throughout
the land.

Some of these monasteries enjoyed rights similar

to those of the pfleger: taxation, justice, and police.21
Church and state were completely intertwined.

Many

clergymen held important posts in the government, and
secular officials served on a series of ecclesiastical
boards or colleges.
entities varied.

The jurisdiction of these political

Some controlled education, others

censorship, and others the economy.

The Catholic dominated

collegiate boards were in charge of mines, industry, timber,
and the minting of coinage.

These cumbersome councils were

responsible to the elector as well as other allegiances,

20

Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 116.

21

Higby, The Religious Policy, 31, 50-52. These
dioceses were those of Sulzburg, Passau, Regensburg,
Freising, Augsburg, Eichstaedt, Bamberg, Chiemsee, and
Constance.
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such as to Rome or Vienna.

Leadership was always divided,

each member possessing an equal vote.22
Catholic theology guided nearly everything.

Though

relations between church and state were at times strained,
even during the reign of Karl Theodor,

the sheer longevity

of their power, cemented fast to the state by the Concordat
of 1583 and amended by a long string of electoral edicts,23
made the idea of reform a distant dream, embraced by a few.
Just as in times past, Catholics remained skeptical of
liberalism, the Protestants, and foreigners.

The College

for the Censorship of Books banned all works by Weiland,
Lessing, and Frederick the Great.24

Catholic mythology, holy

symbols and statues, and feast days predominated in every
town and village.

Leaders of the ancient faith prohibited

freedom of the press and stifled economic growth by
restricting ties with non-Catholic business partners.
Education was the stronghold of the Catholic
establishment.

Though an Academy of Science had been

founded in Munich in 1759 during the electorate of
Maximilian Joseph III,

most Bavarian schools lagged far

behind those of neighboring states.
ideology dominated the curriculum.

Dogma and Catholic
Local clergymen

22

Ramm, Germany, 1789-1919: A Political History,
(London: Methuen & Co., 1967) 4-5.
23

Montgelas,

24

Compte Rendu, 117.

Higby, The Religious Policy, 40-41.
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responsible for the majority of the schools were underpaid
and the schools poorly financed.

An exasperated Montgelas

wrote, "Ce systeme fit beaucoup de mal: 1'education avoit
deja fait trop de progres pour qu'elle n'eut pas produit
quelques sujets distingues.1,25

During the 18th Century, the

Wittelsbachs fought a losing battle to encourage the
citizenry to learn German properly, and it was believed that
not all the people spoke the German language, much less read
it.26

Some bishops attempted cooperation with the laity to

bring about progressive education, but for the most part
Catholics represented the past, out of touch with the
evolving world.

Hope of change remained distant.

Karl

Theodor, though no great friend of Catholics, helped foster
a government in which they could remain in power.

His

policy in turn aided the Catholics in keeping out the
Protestants who, though it must not be overstated, possessed
ideas about education which were much more progressive than
those of their counterparts.
Catholic leaders continued to enforce the 1524
decision outlawing Protestant faith in Bavaria.
for heresy could be very stiff,

Punishment

with the guilty subject to

fines, floggings, banishment, confiscation of property or

25

Montgelas,

26

Hughes,

Compte Rendu, 121.

Nationalism, 20.
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even beheading and burning at the stake.27

It was believed

only three official Protestants lived in Munich in 1799.
The evangelical faith, where it existed, had to worship in
private, usually in the homes of the small congregation.
The construction of churches was forbidden.

Safe areas, as

established by Imperial law or by the whim of local lords,
existed in the duchy of Sulzbach and the lordships of
Pyrbaum, Ortenberg, and Sulzburg.28

Though many Protestant

industrialists wanted to invest there, legal barriers
prevented economic opportunity.

Lifting of outmoded

restrictions and loosening the hold of the Catholic clergy
would be a cornerstone of Montgelas' religious reforms.
Catholic hegemony weighed heavier on another group, the
ever-persistent Jews of Bavaria.

Since their expulsion by

Albert V in 1553, their restrictions surpassed that even of
the Protestants.

More severe indictments, including heresy,

were usually reserved for those of Jewish faith.

Synagogues

had to be carefully hidden in the private homes of
individuals since public worship, just as in the case of
Protestants, was prohibited.

Most Jews could not even

remain within Bavarian borders;

those with business in

Bavaria were issued a pass good for a few days or weeks.
They were confined to ghettoes, except in Munich, but even

27

Higby,
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The Religious Policy,

Ibid., 42;
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Vedeler,

34-36.

"The Genesis of Toleration..."
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in the capital their actions were carefully observed.

They

had to wear distinctive dress, were prohibited from public
posts, most domestic jobs, and all guilds.
neither buy, rent, nor sell land.

They could

To foster their diverse

businesses, the Munich government allowed the peddling of
their wares two days a week from specified inns across the
countryside, and these merchants were subject to scrutiny
and a demanding poll tax.

Any effort to lift these

restrictions before the accession of Maximilian Joseph IV
had been forcefully denied.29
Reform might have been possible under an enlightened
leader, but until 1799 Bavaria never enjoyed such rule.
From 1777 to 1799, Karl Theodor presided over this
ramshackle arrangement.

Succeeding his more moderate

brother, Max Joseph III (1727-1777), this elector was
disliked by the small, ambitious middle-class, the Hapsburg
government yearning to absorb Bavarian lands, and the
Catholics.
decision.

The wavering leader seemed incapable of
Vergennes, France's minister for foreign affairs

under Louis XVI, described Karl Theodor well:
Although by nature intelligent, he has never
succeeded in ruling by himself; he has always been
governed by his ministers or by his father-confessor,
or (for a time) by the electress; This conduct has
increased his natural weakness and apathy to such a
degree that for a long time he has had no opinions
save those inspired in him by his entourage. The

29

Ibid. , 43-49; Vedeler, "The Genesis of
Toleration..." 475-478.
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void which this indolence has left in his soul is
filled with the amusements of the hunt and of music,
and by secret liaisons, for which His Electoral
Majesty has at all time had a particular penchant.30
Epitomizing the image of a decadent king, Karl Theodor
was pompous and extravagant.

He sold privileges and titles

and became involved in all manner of licentious affairs.
Despite a firm friendship with the Pope, he had frequent
spats with powerful bishops within his lands.

At the time

of his death he had nearly bankrupted the state.31

And in

many ways, the administration mimicked the vices of the
elector.
The Bavarian government was a leftover from medieval
days, rife with corruption, controlled at all levels by
petty nobles and Catholic leaders.

Once again the political

geography of the state crippled the effectiveness of the
government.

The Wittelsbach land was divided into three

independent administrations: the Palatinate, Berg, and
Bavaria proper.

Within these three provinces existed a

semblance of government function: a court of appeals, a
presidential council, ecclesiastical colleges, minor courts,
and a military establishment.32

Most important were the

30

Quoted in J.C. Easton, "Charles Theodor of Bavaria and
Count Rumsford," Journal of Modern History, vol. 12, 1940,
145-146.
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Ibid. , 147; Higby, The Religious Policy,
also Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 117-122.
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executive and legislative bodies, which fell under the
direct jurisdiction of the elector.

Karl Theodor exercised

his personal influence in the administrative councils in the
Palatinate, for he hated Munich and only reluctantly went
there to rule.33
These councils met together under the suzerainty of the
elector or his representatives to discuss matters of import.
Karl Theodor's own administration, when it did convene in
Munich, included a Minister of Finance, an attache-minister
for affairs in Upper Palatinate, Neuberg, and Sulzbach,

the

Grand Chancellor of justice, police, and fiefs, a Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and two ministers with no departments,
nominally acting as advisors or special envoys of the
elector.34

For military affairs there existed a council of

war, though Montgelas records the multiplicity of domains
and demands for fealty to the Imperial Circles made the army
relatively impotent.35

The ministers met once or twice a

week at the discretion of the elector.

Most of the men

33

Easton, J.C. "Charles Theodor of Bavaria and Count
Rumsford," 145-160. Though Karl Theodor was known as the
Elector of Bavaria, the Electorate of the Palatinate was
senior to that of Bavaria, and so, when he assumed the title
in 1777, the electorate of Bavaria was absorbed into the
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34

Higby, The Religious Policy, 28. In 1778, this
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Ramm, Germany, 3-5.
35

Montgelas,
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appointed to these positions were friends of the elector,
petty nobles or Imperial knights.
experience or ability.

Few possessed any

The level of competence can be seen

in the ex-Jesuit Father Lippert, one of the elector's
closest advisors, whom Karl Theodor's cabinet secretary,
Stephan von Stengel, described as "the most stupid, or
rather the sole blockhead among all the Jesuits that I ever
knew...a scandal mongerer of the first class and a most
unblushing liar."36
One exception, however, to this inept majority, was the
British-born Benjamin Thompson, Count of Rumsford.

As chief

minister of Bavaria under Karl Theodor from 1784 to 1798,
Rumsford was in some ways the vanguard of the approaching
reform movement.

Rumsford attempted some strategies that

earned even Montgelas praise.

The British minister focused

mainly on domestic reforms, some of them albeit superficial,
such as the expensive beautification program in Munich,
embellishing the capital by building the Englische Garten
and refurbishing older buildings in a vain effort to please
Karl Theodor.

However, Rumsford did help suppress

mendicancy in the country and abolish usury.

Most

importantly, he created special work-houses to occupy the

36

Quoted from Higby, The Religious Policy, 30.

37

Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 14. "Le comte de Rumford, a
cote d'une grande energie contre la mendicite et d'un
etablissement en grand pour 1'industrie..."
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poor.

Though a far cry from a solution, these houses of

industry helped lower the unemployment rate in the larger
urban areas,
electorate.38

an ever-present problem throughout the
These were, however, of limited success.

On

the whole the ministers of Karl Theodor exemplified all that
was hated in the ancien regime--greed, corruption and
inefficiency.

Their time of ascendancy was at an end.

The political and social situation in Bavaria over
which Karl Theodor presided did not exist in a vacuum.
Around the far-flung lands of the electorate, great changes
were afoot.

The French Revolution and its sweeping ideology

fostered an atmosphere encouraging to reform.

The new

government would waste little time harnessing the potential
energy offered by the changing tide in Europe.

And the new

ministers who replaced the decadent advisors of Karl Theodor
were visionaries of far greater vigor.

38

Easton, "Charles Theodor and of Bavaria and Count
Rumsford," 155: Maximilian von Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten
des Bayerischen staatsministers Maximilian Grafen von
Montgelas, 1799-1817, (Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G.
Cotta'schen buchhandlung, 1887) 17, hereafter referred to
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Chapter 2
Pushing the Envelope:

Bavarian reforms before 1806

"We must deprive the Reichshofrat of the desire to
exhibit its own impotence."
--Freiherr von Gravenreuth1
"Je ne veux pas prendre la Baviere, je veux la
manger!"
--Emperor Francis II to Ambassador
Nogarola on the announcement of the
Franco-Bavarian Alliance,2
Karl Theodor's death and the confirmation of his
successor ushered in a new era in Bavarian history.

The

first six years of Max Joseph's reign would see a revolution
in government affairs on behalf of absolutism.

In foreign

policy, Bavaria rarely was able to influence events.

The

1799-1805 period saw the growing dominance of Napoleon's
France; thus many of the changes enacted by Max Joseph's
ministers necessarily occurred under a protective French
umbrella.

Internally, this period is characterized by rapid

secularization of church lands and the permanent dissolution
of Catholic ascendancy; rampant mediatization of minor
states and aggrandizement of their territory; and a struggle
against the recidivism of the nobility, the Imperial cities,
and the Reichsritterschaft.

Quoted in Klaus Epstein, the Genesis of German
Conservatism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)
630 .
2

"I don't want to take Bavaria, I want to eat it!"
Quoted in d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 70.
34

35

I
The New Government

The succession to the Bavarian throne was not without
difficulty.

Just as at the death of childless Max Joseph

III in 1777, the Austrians eagerly anticipated the demise of
Karl Theodor, who in his many years failed to produce a male
heir.

Emperor Francis II greatly desired to accomplish what

no other Hapsburg had, the annexation of the Wittelsbach
lands.

But the Bavarian house had many branches.

From one

of the smaller territories appeared the closest relative to
the deceased elector, a man with a viable claim to
succession, the Duke of Zweibriicken,

Maximilian Joseph.

An ardent Francophile, Max Joseph's background gave him
ample opportunity to sample French civilization.

Born May

27, 1756, in the small town of Schwetzingen, he was the
fourth child of the Austrian Field Marshal Frederick Michel
Count of Birkenfeld.

The father showed little interest in

his son and shuttled him off to an uncle, Duke Christian IV
of Deux-Points, the ruler of Zweibriicken.

Trained in the

schools of Alsace, learning both German and French, Max
Joseph ultimately assumed command of a German regiment at
Strasbourg, a unit itself subsidized by Louis XVI of France.
Max Joseph took quickly to noble life, running up
considerable bills for hunts, food, and clothing.
Prince Max etait un bourreau d'argent,"
Oberkirch.

"Le

wrote the Baron of

"Le roi Louis XVI avait paye ses dettes (a
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plusiers reprises, dont 945,000 francs en 1788).... "3 The
young army officer continued a successful if peaceful career
with French and German units.

He married Princess

Wilhelmine-Auguste of Hesse-Darmstadt, with whom he had
three sons and two daughters.

After her death he married

the anti-French, Protestant Princess Caroline of Baden,
distantly related to both the King of Sweden and the Czar of
Russia.

Upon the death of Christian IV, Max Joseph became

Duke of Zweibriicken on April 1, 1795.

After Karl Theodor's

death, the ministries and legal estates of the
landschaftverordnete (the permanent committee delaing with
the rights of herr and landrechte) upheld his claim to the
Electorate of Bavaria.

With great excitement he assumed the

title of Elector of Bavaro-Palatinate, February 20, 1799, as
Max Joseph IV, and quickly moved to Munich.4
The new elector shared some of Karl Theodor's less
respectable characteristics: love for the hunt, plays,
operas, audiences with foreign emissaries, royal concerts
and balls.

He was vacillating at times, seemingly unable to

focus his attention fully to the political matters at hand.
When pressed, he wavered as long as possible, trying to move
in the most advantageous direction at the right moment.

3

Marcel Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne: Le systeme
continental et les debuts du royaume de Baviere, 1806-1810,
(Paris: Librarie Plon, 1942) 49. Dunan quotes Baron
d'Oberkirch from his memoirs.
4
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Montgelas' accelerated reform programs, foreign affairs, and
possibilities for land acquisition gave lease to Max
Joseph's impetuosity.

Despite the stabilizing influence of

his wife, the elector remained true to the political
traditions of the Bavarian state, looking to France whenever
necessary for aid, leadership, and ideas.
Max Joseph IV enjoyed a considerable rapport with
Napoleon Bonaparte.

Though the Corsican, ignoring his own

ancestry, thought the Bavarian elector and his wife less
than polished, he gave them the same courtesy he extended to
the other monarchs of Europe.

The French conqueror's

portrait of the pair was, despite his own personal
displeasure at the elector's opulent tendencies, fair and
quite illuminating:
The Queen of Bavaria was pretty. I liked very
much being in her company. One day at the hunt the
king had started off before me, and I had promised to
follow him, but I remained chatting with the Queen for
an hour and a half. That gave occassion for gossip,
and roused the king to anger. When the Royal Pair met
again, the King scolded the Queen. But she replied,
'Would you have me throw the Emperor out the door?'
From that time on I had to pay dearly for this
gallantry; for the King and Queen followed
me on my
journey to Italy in the winter of 1807, and I had them
always around me. They had bad carriages which used to
break down every moment, and I was obliged eventually
to take them into my own. In Venice they were also with
me. At bottom, I was not vexed, for now I had royalty
in my suit .5

5

F.M. Kircheisen, (editor), Memoirs of Napoleon I:
Compiled from his own writings, (New York: Duffield & Co.,
1929) 126. Also quoted verbatim in General Baron Gourgaud,
Talks with Napoleon at St. Helena (trans, by Elizabeth
Wormeley Latimer), (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.,1904) 150-
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Claude Francois Meneval relates another illuminating
tale about the elector's nervousness.

In late 1809,

Napoleon, in celebration of his marriage to Marie Louise of
Austria, invited Max Joseph and Caroline to Paris.

While

escorting the royal pair around Fontainebleu, privately
touring the rooms built expressely for the new Empress,
Napoleon led them into a dark, narrow flight of stairs, so
close that the portly Max Joseph had to turn sideways to
negotiate them.

At the bottom,

when no light was

forthcoming and they stood in quiet darkness, the King of
Bavaria suddenly cried out that there was going to be an
ambush!

Napoleon thought the entire affair very humorous,

and the German prince's nervous exclamation did little to
change Napoleon's faith in him.6
Publicly, Max Joseph radiated his love for France.

"I

ask you to communicate to the Directory that they have no
more loyal friend than I," the elector proclaimed to a
pleased French ambassador.

"On the occassion of every

French victory, I feel like a Frenchman!"7

Events in 1813

would later prove the limits of his loyalty as he led the
mass German defection from the Confederation.

However, for

151.
6

Claude Francois Meneval, Memoirs Illustrating the
History of Napoleon I from 1802 to 1815 (ed. by Baron
Napoleon Joseph de Meneval), 2 vols. (New York: Appleton &
Company, 1894) 11:268, 275.
7
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a time he would become one of Napoleon's staunchest allies.
Such a friendship would pay handsome dividends.
Max Joseph's popularity grew rapidly at home and
abroad.

He was affectionately called "le Henri IV bavarois"

by his courtiers and political allies. Though not without
enemies, especially in foreign courts, Max Joseph took great
care to polish his image for his people.8

Desirous of

changing the economic and social position of Bavaria, he did
not have the patience, drive, nor, it would seem, the
political nerve to do so.

He was able, however, to pick

excellent advisors, and fortunately there was a capable,
industrious, and willing man with him who had the qualities
to push ahead and effect real reform in the state.

That

adept administrator was Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas.
Born September 12, 1759, to a minor Savoyard noblemen ,
and the Countess of Trauner, Maximilian von Montgelas would
become both a revered and hated figure in Bavarian history.9
Like his patron, Montgelas enjoyed a French education.

His

mother desired his entry into the clergy, but his father,

8

Dunan,

9

Napoleon et l'Allemagne, 50-51.

Eberhard Weis, Montgelas, 1759-1799: Zwischen
Revolution und Reform, (C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung,
Miinchen, 1971) is the only real biography of Montgelas, and
it does not cover the period of the Electorate and Kingdom
of Bavaria. Another work covering most of his political
accomplishments is an early work by Doeberl, Ludwig,
Maximilian von Montgelas und das Prinzip der
Staatsouveranitat. There are currently no English
biographies of the statesman.
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recently moved to Munich and serving as a Bavarian official,
and who died a general in the Bavarian army, directed his
son into politics.

Montgelas studied at Freysing and Nancy,

and upon his arrival at Strasbourg he enrolled alongside
fellow classmates Metternich and Goethe in studies in
diplomacy, history, and public rights.10

To complete his

schooling he returned to Bavaria and the University of
Ingolstadt.

There he became loosely associated with the

secret society known as the Illuminati, a covert liberal
organization of scholars and bureaucrats desiring change in
Germany.

When this uncoordinated group was rooted out by

Karl Theodor, Montgelas, himself only a minor member, was
forced to flee.

Too brilliant to remain unemployed long, he

greatly desired to serve a Wittelsbach ruler, and so he came
to Christian IV of Deux-Ponts in 1785, who employed the
aspiring young politician as a minor official.11

Aware of

Montgelas' talents, when Max Joseph took control of
Zweibriicken he offered Montgelas a position as Minister of
Foreign Affairs.

Montgelas also became the Duke's informal

personal advisor.

10

Dunan, Napoleon et l'Allemagne, 55-56.
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The new minister's devotion to Max Joseph was absolute,
even when his zeal for reform threatened certain aspects of
his lordship's sovereignty.

"Ein privatmann kann sich aus

einer Notlage durch arbeit und Aktivitat wieder befreien,"
he wrote. "Fur einen entthronten Souveran weifi ich jedoch
keinen anderen gesicherten Ort als das Grab."12

The two

worked well together during their four years in Zweibriicken,
conditioning their relationship for the task to come.
Montgelas guarded his repartee with Max Joseph very
carefully.

An Austrian official, Steigentesch, wrote, "M.

de Montgelas doit sa place et sa reputation a la paresse du
roi et a 1'habitude qu'a ce prince de le voir toujours a
cote de lui.

Son grand but est le plaisir; c'est au

plaisier qu'il sacrifie tout."13
True or not, Montgelas had an ambitious mind and a
driving personality.
the French Revolution.

He was quick to embrace the ideas of
Montgelas "never failed for a moment

to recognize that the young dynasty had everything to fear
from the Hofburg and everything to hope from Napoleon
Bonaparte."14

His goals, vast and challenging in number,

revolved around the concept of total sovereignty, an
absolute monarchy, invested in his patron, the Elector Max

12

Letter from Montgelas to Max Joseph, September 14,
1798, quoted in Weis, Montgelas, 452.
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Joseph.

Outspoken, he often announced his zeal for change:

"On commengoit a desirer, a parler meme ouvertement de
reformes."15 To Montgelas the Holy Roman Empire stood as a
monument of the dead past. Likewise the history of Bavaria
gave testimony to missed opportunities.

Thus he saw several

obstacles to be overthrown before a progressive state could
be constructed; the Holy Roman Empire and its institutions,
the awkward and medieval constitution of the state, the
nobility and their privileges, the entrenched position of
the Catholic church, and the sluggish economy would be the
foes he generally assaulted.
earned his ire.

The nobles in particular

Their hereditary privileges, as opposed to

the rights of middle class industrialists or the poor, could
not, Montgelas believed, be justified in a modern state.
To launch his revolution, Montgelas would need a
qualified group of electoral ministers.
Munich, he wasted little time.

Once ensconced in

Less than two weeks passed

before all of Karl Theodor's entourage had been summarily
dismissed.

Father Lippert and the rest recieved their

pensions and dismissals by February 29, 1799.15

An edict

four days previous organized the Staatconferenz,
establishing four ministries to run the electorate.
Montgelas' chosen men were of the new bureaucratic elite

15

Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 102.

16
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drawn from the ranks of businessmen, lesser nobles,
entrepreneurs, lawmakers, scholars, and professionals.

This

class was just beginning to define itself through its hard
work and support of capitalism, the exact ideals promulgated
by the new Savoyard minister.17

The contribution to reform

in Bavaria by the new ministers would be manifold.

Their

labor and dedication aided them in creating a working
bureaucratic state.

Their business and academic ties

transcended the boundaries of the state, bringing in
international trade and more dynamic ideals.

Similarly

their greatly pro-Protestant attitude encouraged the growth
of a nascent, embryonic capitalism traditionally fostered by
the evangelical faith.
Montgelas assumed leadership of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.

Henri Thoedor, comte Topor Morawitzky, a learned

scholar, former director of the Munich Academy of Science,
and the youngest member of the Aulic Council in history,
became Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs.

Jean-Guillaume,

Baron Hompesch-Bollheim, succeeded his own father as
Minister of Finance.

The amiable Hompesch would do much to

streamline the budget and keep Max Joseph's spending within
reason.

Baron von Hertling became Minister of Justice.18
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Besides these gentleman, Montgelas assembled an able
bureaucratic staff, including the zealous religious
administrator Frederick von Zentner ("the right arm of
Montgelas"),19 the Francophile authors Karl Hans Lang and
Christopher von Aretin, political theorist Joseph Hazzi, and
agriculturalist Joseph Reingruber.

The army came under the

command of feldmarschall Carl Philippe von Wrede, Bavaria's
most prominent soldier and an ardent Francophobe.

Wrede

usually displayed more courage than tactical ability.20
Montgelas was also served well by Freiherr von Gravenreuth
and Antoine de Cetto, his chief diplomatic attache and
ambassador to France respectively.

Though poorly organized

at the outset, this able group immediately began to
formulate a plan for change.
The drive for change would attract many famous Germans
to join the Bavarian revolution: Anselm Feuerbach,

Karl von

Savigny, Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, Friedrich Niethammer,
and G.W.F. Hegel among them.

They came to Bavaria during

the Montgelas period and made their enduring impression.
Despite such able company, however, another man would be
necessary to allow the consummation of Montgelas' plans:

staatskonferenz caused more than a little murmuring among
the nobility.
19
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Napoleon Bonaparte.

This point is a crucial one.

Though a

new bureaucracy was burgeoning and the government had begun
to remove barriers to progress within Wittelsbach lands,
international affairs and especially the Holy Roman Empire
limited how far Montgelas could go.

Crucial to his plans

was the irrevocable destruction of feudal privileges and
existing political boundaries.

Geographically, Bavaria

remained confined by the patchwork hegemony of Reichskriese
and Pflegerrichte. He would be unable to fully implement
the bureaucratic system he envisioned while they existed.
Max Joseph was impotent in the face of even a very troubled
Austria.

No feasible plan of land consolidation existed;

military action was out of the question.

Austria, France,

and probably even Prussia would not tolerate aggressive
international action by the largest Mittelstaat; besides,
Bavaria's military remained a hollow shell.
Certain events between 1799 and 1805 would show
Bavaria's inability, even impotence, in mastering the
existing structure of German politics.

Even before the

creation of Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine, it was
obvious that without the endorsement of France, certain
goals could not be met, certain accomplishments would remain
only possibilities.

Therefore, especially during the first

six years of Max Joseph's reign, events would come to pass
that illuminated the necessity, if not the direct sanction,
of Napoleon Bonaparte.
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II
Bavaria and European Affairs, 1799-1805

The international sphere was such that the Bavarian
leaders could not control their own destiny.

In 1799, the

existence of their state depended largely on events beyond
their ability to influence.

Political, social, and economic

forces far more massive than any previously seen in European
history moved across the continent.

The French Revolution

heralded an eventual shift of power from the nobles and king
toward the influential entrepreneurs, industrialists, and
middle class.

The explosion of industrial power in Great

Britain rang the death knell of agricultural Europe.

Of

utmost importance to Bavaria was Napoleon Bonaparte's rise
to dominance in European affairs.

To his meteoric success

would the francophile Max Joseph briefly attach the fortunes
of his kingdom.

The association could be deemed on the

whole a great success for Bavaria.

The 1799-1805

period, before the creation of the Confederation of the
Rhine, illustrates Bavaria's need for outside assistance.
This is not to say that French action is completely
responsible for Bavarian success.

It is also not to say

that Bavarian leaders did not attempt to force a change.
Often their actions brought them to precarious
circumstances.

In most of these instances, Max Joseph, not

Montgelas, initiated the event.

Ambitious and impetuous,

the elector often recklessly forged ahead, disregarding even
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the obvious consequences.

His imprudence not only required

a bailout by France but also assisted in instigating two
wars.

The first of these transgressions occurred before a

full year of his reign had passed.
In 1785, Duke William of Bavaria headed a secret
commission charged with the difficult but necessary task of
drawing up the plan for a Wittelsbach succession upon Karl
Theodor's death.

Without an heir, Karl Theodor feared

Austrian annexation, thus William was named as the next
elector.

Max Joseph's claim, of course, superceded

William's, but one part of the original scheme survived.
William, in order to solidify his position in the face of
Austria and the meddlesome church, was, among other things,
to seize and secularize the possessions of the Order of
Malta, long thought to be agents of foreign powers.

With

little thought as to the dangerous results of this action,
Max Joseph pursued his predecessor's plan with great vigor.
Four days prior to Karl Theodor's imminent death, Max
Joseph's agents, in conjunction with officers of Karl
Theodor's government, openly declared the Order of Malta
abolished.

All treasuries became property of the state, the

commanderies were closed and not to be reopened, and the
members exiled from the state.

But Bavarian clout simply

did not command enough respect for such a move and the issue
exploded; the new titular Grand Master of the Order of Malta
was His Majesty Czar Paul of Russia.

Already contemplating

the idea of joining the Second Coalition, Paul, angered at
Max Joseph's impudence, threatened invasion.

The elector,

pressured by Austria for troop commitments to the coalition
he did not desire to yield, feared being forced into the new
war against France.

The French naturally applauded

Bavaria's independent action in defiance of Austria and her
allies, but no support was forthcoming.

Paul pitched his

considerable military weight on the side of Great Britain
and Austria.

He subsequently declared Bavaria an enemy

state to be treated as such upon the arrival of the savage
Marshal Suvarov, currently ravaging French possessions and
armies in Italy.

With little hope of real French support,

Max Joseph buckled.

On July 12, 1799, an agreement with

Russia reinstated the Order of Malta, all of its lands and
possessions, and made the Bavarian Grand Prior a hereditary
noble (the reprieve would last nine years).

An intensified

commitment followed; on October 1, 1799, a full treaty was
signed with Russia and Bavaria became a minor ally of the
coalition partners, sending 4,000 men to join Suvarov and
Rimsky-Korsakov in the abortive Swiss campaign.21

21
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lesson, however, made little of a lasting impression upon
the elector.
In the meantime allied fortunes turned sour.

Hapsburg

intractability greatly aided the cause of the French.

The

Austrian Hofkreigsrat, ever a thorn in Suvarov's side,
continued to deny him supreme command on the field,
withholding crucial unity of command from allied forces on
the Upper Danube and Rhine Rivers.

The delay doomed Rimsky-

Korsakov' s Russian army to disaster at the Battle of Zurich.
Suvarov, and shortly thereafter Russia herself, withdrew
from the war.

The French Army of the Moselle under Moreau

entered Bavaria on December 2, 1800, and at the Battle of
Hohenlinden defeated the Austrians under the capable
Archduke Charles.

Combined with Napoleon's narrow yet

decisive victory at Marengo in June, these two battles
sealed the fate of the Second Coalition, securing French
influence in Middle and South Germany for the next fifteen
years.
Suffering his second major defeat, the normally
industrious Emperor Francis vacillated, hoping to delay the
inevitable reparations of the upcoming peace negotiations.
The humiliating Treaty of Luneville, signed by French
ambassadors and Francis II himself, defined the nature of
the French peace conditions and helped start the

50

entschadigungsplan, or the Prince's Revolution, which would
cause the downfall of the Holy Roman Empire.22
French involvement in the disintegration of the Reich
began long before Luneville.

The process accelerated by

Luneville actually began at the end of the War of the First
Coalition, when the Treaty of Campo-Formio called for
negotiations for land annexations between France and Austria
at the Congress of Rastatt.

Proceedings were interrupted by

the War of the Second Coalition, but the lingering affects
of the Congress, which set in motion the mediatization of
ecclesiastical and imperial states, would be aggravated and
accelerated by newest round of negotiations.
Napoleon, of course, wished to inflame whatever
hostility the German princes felt toward the Reich.

France

traditionally had played Prussia and Austria against one
another.

Napoleon wished for more than this, and the Treaty

of Luneville contained the embryo which would eventually
become the Confederation of the Rhine.

Prussia and Austria

could continue to bicker, but a third party would
undoubtedly weaken Germany as a whole, especially when
backed by French military might.23

German reform parties

22

Ramm, Germany, 4 9-51.
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The idea for a third force originated during the
Directory at the insistance of Talleyrand and Abbe Sieyes,
Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 26. The French
Emperor did not originally see it this way. The interests
of Czar Alexander in Germany were considerable, due to many
Romanov relatives in various positions throughout the
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represented a fertile ideological seedbed for such
endeavors.
idea.

Some German leaders already entertained the

A popular pamphlet issued by Count Bignon of France

and Baron Waitz of Hesse-Cassel expressed the need for a
Germanic federation, one that excluded Austria and Prussia.
"Such a federation would be favorable to France, because it
would act as a counterbalace against the two great powers,
Austria and Prussia."24

If it developed, this group would

theoretically owe its allegiance to France.

France in turn

would act as the "protector of these states," though as
James Sheehan notes the distinction between allies and
victims was "very subtle indeed."25

empire; the elector's wife was one of these. Napoleon, in
his on-going attempt to bring Russia to his side, at first
thought Russia could be the third party, as Paul and then
Alexander both expressed desire to arbitrate disputes in
various German states. In this manner the gulf between
Austria and Prussia would widen considerably. "By this means
the German Empire will find itself in reality divided by
two, for its affairs will be directed from two different
centers. Assuming these arrangements successful, would the
constitution of Germany still exist? Yes and no; yes,
because it would not have been abolished; no, because its
affairs would no longer be ordered as a whole and there
would be more opposition than ever between Berlin and
Vienna. Time and other considerations would then decide our
policy." Napoleon to Talleyrand, April 3, 1802, quoted in
Bruun, Geoffrey, Europe vs. the French Imperium, 1799-1814,
(New York: Harper & Bros. Publishing, 1938) 116.
24
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Napoleon and the German reformers thus seemed in
accord; the outdated Holy Roman Empire needed change.

The

Treaty of Luneville was the first vehicle by which this
would be achieved.

Terms announced that Belgium, Flanders,

the Imperial city of Liege, and nearly the entire left bank
of the Rhine, including Wittelsbach territories of Julich,
Berg, and most importantly the Palatinate, would become part
of with France.

In compensation for their losses, princes

of the minor houses of Germany would receive indemnification
from existing territories of the Reich, as stipulated in
Article Seven of the Treaty.26

It also called for

mediatization of ecclesiastical lands and the geographical
consolidation of the larger states, the very thing Montgelas
needed but could not achieve on his own.

At Luneville the

signatories gained peace at the price of tradition and
symbolism; it was the death knell of the existing order.
Minor states eagerly submitted numerous plans for
redistribution.

Bavarian delegates, on Montgelas

instruction, suggested that Francis, as Reichoberhaupt,
should propose a full plan for secularization and then
withdraw himself completely from the process.

Then on April

20, 1801, through the Council of Electors, Max Joseph called
for the Hapsburg ruler to negotiate as the presiding officer
of the upcoming assembly.

26

Francis, however, supporting the

Quoted in full in d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 54.
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nobles, free cities, and ecclesiastical territories, desired
to conduct the entire affair himself.

The reichsoberhaupt

resolved to defend as much of the Empire as he could.
Although pressed by Napoleon and encouraged by other
enthusiastic German princes, Francis refused to preside over
the dissolution of the Reich.21 The process dragged on until
Napoleon, with Czar Alexander's silent approval, attempted
to solve the matter himself.

A formal delegation of the

Empire was charged with completing the mediatization.
Representatives from Bohemia (a Hapsburg territory), Saxony,
Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Hesse-Cassel, the Teutonic Order, and
the increasingly important Free-City of Mainz, led by Karl
Dalberg, the arch-chancellor of the German Empire
constituted the negotiating body.

The decision of this

Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, popularly referred to as the
"Conclusion of the Empire," gave substance to the settlement
conceived at Luneville.
The decision of this assembly, pronounced February 25,
1803, radically altered the face of German politics.

One-

hundred twelve German states disappeared forever, duchies,
baronies, counties, ecclesiastical lands alike.

27
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resulting reorganization, Bavaria lost the Electorate of the
Palatinate, the duchies of Jiilich and Berg, and the
Principates of Simmern, Lautern, Veldenz, and Max Joseph's
own Zweibriicken, encompassing 800,000 citizens.28

These were

Rhenish possessions and most had been under French militaryrule since mid-1800.

In return, Bavaria received two very

profitable principalities, the bishoprics of Wiirzburg and
Bamberg, along with fifteen Imperial free cities, including
Ulm and Nordlingen, the smaller bishopric of Freysing, parts
of (including the city of) the important arch-bishopric of
Augsburg, and parts of Passau and Eichstadt.

The total gain

in citizens brought the electorate's population close to
three million.29

The consolidation of Bavaria's borders that

had been beyond Max Joseph's powers was accomplished through
consular fiat.
During this period Bavaria endured a tenuous diplomatic
existence.

Though defeated, Austria had not given up hopes

28
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Nordlingen, Ulm, Bopfingen, Buchhorn, Wangen, Leutkirch, and
Ravensberg.

55

of using diplomacy to reverse the results of the 1800
campaign.

The proximity of Hapsburg armies weighed heavily

on the Bavarian administration, for France was still far
away.

True to his pro-French tendencies, Max Joseph

instructed Montgelas to negotiate with France, seeking a
protective alliance.

The Austrians offered their own

treaties, all of which involved the absorption of minor
Bavarian areas and military obligations.

On August 24,

1801, however, Napoleon's ambassador to Bavaria, LouisGuillaume Otto, an accomplished diplomat, signed with
Bavarian representatives an agreement on economic and
political relations between France and Bavaria, including a
significant monetary indemnity to Max Joseph.30

Austrian

counter-proposals followed, but Bavaria successfully avoided
them.

France and Austria nearly came to blows again during

this period.

In 1802, with the Reichsdeputation's decision

imminent, Max Joseph took another step which nearly
embroiled his domain in war.

Once more, he was merely

following a policy that defined his agenda, but once more
events made manifest the fact that Bavarian liberties had
their limitations.

The issue in question was the fate of

the Reichsritterschaft.
With the impending revisions to German political
geography, the "Immediate Imperial Nobility," or

30
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Reichsunmittelbarkeit, became keenly aware that if the
Imperial cities and the ecclesiastical states could be
mediatized, then their own situation was rapidly becoming
desperate.

Led by Karl Freiherr von Gemmingen, a Prussian,

the knights desperately sought answers to their dilemma.31
Refuge was becoming scarce; most German states were
discarding old allegiances and the knights had no place in
the new order.

Prussia had launched the initial assault on

the Imperial nobility as early as 1796.

Following their

lead, Max Joseph's regime decided the time was right to
emulate Hardenberg and the Berlin reformers.

Sovereignty

and the legitimacy of the elector's regime motivated this
move.

Montgelas believed the mere presence of the knights

to be symbolic of a dead past.32

More banal, practical

motives guided the reformers as well.

As in the case of

secularizing church lands, there were a large number of
wealthy estates which stood to be gained.
The attack on the Reichsritterschaft transpired in
three interwoven stages.

Many knights owed allegiance to

bishoprics in Franconia, which in 1803 suddenly became
Bavarian property and were subject to the reformers policy

31
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of dismantling religious corporations.

Max Joseph ordered

the seizure of some knightly possessions.

During this time,

in one of the outlying cantons, a former official from
Weimar and knight of the empire, August von Kalb, facing the
loss of his lands to either his brother-in-law (as a result
of a lengthy lawsuit) or to the eager Bavarian government,
decided that he would sell the Von Kalb lands to Bavaria in
exchange for a considerable payment.

At once, Franconian

officials, not yet under Bavarian jurisdiction, appealed to
Francis, contending that no knight could arbitrarily give up
his obligations to the Empire.

Francis replied at once:

In view of the most dangerous consequences, which
the imitation of the conduct of the Kalb brothers would
involve for out Imperial prerogatives and the entire
constitution of the Reichsritterschaft, it is incumbant
on me to warn you, the members of the Franconian
Reichsritterschaft...against such conduct as contrary
to all principles of honor and duty...I command you,
upon pain of our Imperial displeasure, and the
certainity of severe punishment, to scrupulouly
observe and fulfill all obligations owed to the
knightly order and to ourselves as your oberhaupt.33
Max Joseph responded by appointing Count Friedrich of
Thtirheim to an ad hoc post with the responsibility of
disabling the knights through harassment and monetary
inducements.

On October 9, 1803, an electoral edict

renounced all knightly jurisdiction, though land and homes

33
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would not be taken.34
and preferments.

Some knights succumbed to the bribes

When others did not, Max Joseph moved

swiftly, despite his promises of leniency.

Bavarian

infantry moved out into the countryside; negotiations now
involved frontal assaults on private castles and minor
skirmishes in the field.

Houses were ramsacked, furniture,

paintings, and personal possessions stolen or destroyed.
Land and manors were occupied.35

Before the von Kalb issue

was resolved, Max Joseph sparked a second, more serious
crisis.
That same autumn, Bavarian troops occupied the eastern
principality of Oberhausen on the Austro-Bavarian border,
occupying the houses of the local knights.

Tempers were

already high over the division of Passau and the von Kalb
action.

This further act of naked aggression induced

Francis to send his white-coated Austrian soldiers to the

34
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Inn River, the border between Austria and Bavaria.

Philip

Cobenzl, the chief Austrian diplomat, announced that
military force was "the only language that Munich
understood."36

Montgelas cautioned Max Joseph but, desiring

his lord to stand firm, counseled him to hold his ground.
Otto assured the alarmed Max Joseph that France would
support Bavaria politically.

However, in a moment of

charactersitic hesitation, the Elector avoided the threat of
war by evacuating Oberhausen.

Austria considered this a

major victory, and French emissary Champagny declared
soberly:
This (Austria's) satisfaction, which probably was
her due and which she obtained by a menace , gives her
a great advantage over Bavaria in the disputes which
are born each day from the mixture of territories and
the uncertainty of responsible rights. The affair of
Oberhausen may become an argument which the stronger
may recall the weaker, in order to establish all his
pretensions .37
Austrian celebrations ended abruptly when Max Joseph
revealed that, despite his inability to hold ground in the
international arena without (an sometimes in spite of)
French support, Bavaria was not finished with this issue.
Max Joseph initiated the third phase with a renewed, much
more forceful attack on the Reichsritterschaft. The hasty
elector was set on overthrowing all knightly power within

36
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his realm.
confiscated.

Soon, knightly property was again being brutally
Following a futile appeal to Napoleon himself,

which was left unanswered, Gemmingen and his fellows queried
Austria; Could nothing be done?
Once more Austrian troops moved to the Inn and the
pressure rapidly mounted.

The Aulic Council issued a

Konservatorium aimed directly at guilty Bavaria, demanding
the restoration of all knights to their former places.

To

enforce the act, Francis appointed Arch-Chancellor Dalberg
of Mainz, the elector of Saxony and the Duke of Baden as
guardians of the rights of the Reichsritter. By doing so
Francis hoped to legitimize the knight's position by backing
it with the procedures of the Reich.

The three leaders

accepted the order and set to organizing a Regensburg
commission to decide what to do.38
The spring of 1804 found Max Joseph in a new quandary.
Various counter-proposals from Austria complicated the
situation; the machinations of Philip Stadion and the
Archduke Charles confused Max Joseph, who remained was
unsure of Austria's official position on the issue.39
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Napoleon, after the brief respite of the Peace of Amiens was
once more engaged in conflict with Great Britain, had tired
of the affair.

The First Consul did not approve of the

behavior of either country and certainly did not relish the
thought of Austrian army corps assembling on the Inn.
Napoleon encouraged Bavaria to back down.

Max Joseph

reluctantly relented and those knights which still desired
to retain their position were allowed to return.

Napoleon

then admonished Francis February 14, 1804, warning Austria
that "...however occupied France may be with the war she is
now pursuing, she is keeping her eye upon the affairs of the
Continent and on those of Germany, with which they are
intimately connected."40

Napoleon's warning made only a

fleeting impression upon the Austrian and Bavarian
administrations.

Austrian units remained on the Inn River.

The Elector of Bavaria, likewise, slowly reneged on his
promises of restoration.
During this time, it dawned upon Montgelas and Napoleon
that a true defensive alliance might be a possibility.

from his ownership of property presently in Bavarian hands
and his friendship with the Finance Minister, Hompesch.
Stadion hoped to alter Austrian policy in his favor.
Archduke Charles' more official role, ordering his emissary
Fassbinder to approach Gravenreuth about the exchange of
Bavarian possessions along the Inn (i.e. Passau) for
Hapsburg possessions in Swabia, reveals that Austria, too,
dealt with this issue for politically reasons and not just
for the betterment of the Reich.
40

Napoleon to Francis, February 14, 1804, quoted in
Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism, 219.

Bavaria could thus be brought under French protection.

An

act of such magnitude would inevitably touch off a war, but
it appeared that with the recalcitrant Max Joseph continuing
to encroach upon the knight's lands and the continued
presence of Austrian troops
threat.

war was already becoming a real

At first, Napoleon contented himself by repeatedly

calling for disarmament, but it was becoming clear that the
issue required more active measures.

Thus the Franco-

Bavarian alliance came into being not as part of a
conscious, thought-out policy, but rather through reaction
to the immediate situation.
The benefits of such an agreement could be great for
both parties.

Montgelas could proceed with great vigor

under a protective French umbrella;
Reichsdeputation had shown him that.

Luneville and the
France also benefited;

French troops, freely deployed in Bavarian domains, would be
very close the Austrian capital, and the idea of a Frenchsupported confederation had been fermenting in the minds of
Napoleon and Talleyrand.

Though Max Joseph sent

representatives to the meeting of the German princes in
Mainz in September, 1804, and declined to appear personally,
Napoleon did attend, and the concept of a confederation was
quietly discussed.41

41

This was the first of Napoleon's "Grand Reviews" of
which he would become so fond in later years. His passage
would be marked by a brief period of intense government
activity by the local regime to demonstrate their ability.
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Two related events in 1804 exacerbated the situation.
Napoleon's drive for total authority peaked after the
Cadoudal plot of early 1804 and the kidnapping and execution
of the Due d'Enghien.

To solidify his position, Napoleon

sought to elevate himself to the rank of emperor, which,
again by personal fiat, occurred on on May 18, 1804.

His

extraordinary self-coronation took place on December 2 of
the same year.

Francis, rightly fearing for his own elected

status as Oberhaupt, decided to declare himself hereditary
Emperor of Austria.

His was an unmitigated act of self-

preservation and pride, and it astounded the princes of the
Empire.

In response Max Joseph and Frederick of Wurttemberg

declared themselves Kings.

They, too, acted out of self-

interest; both sought European legitimacy.

The difference

was that while Austrian military power would uphold Francis'
new title, it would require Bonaparte to authenticate the
new Bavarian crown.
Meanwhile, the bidding for Bavaria's hand continued.
Angered by Max Joseph's impertinence, Francis convened the
Aulic Council, which at his bidding produced an exzitorium
on March 3, 1805, demanding compliance from Bavaria over the

See Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 39.
Talleyrand, among others, considered this trip a great
success. He called in "une campagne d'or," perhaps because
of the great number of bribes and gifts given him by the
German princes, one of which amounted to £82,000. See C.M.
Talleyrand-Perigord, Memoirs of C.M. Talleyrand de Perigord,
(New York: The International Library Society, 1900) 11:254255 .
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issue of the knights.

Simultaneously French Marshal

Guillaume Brune arrived in Munich as a special envoy of
Emperor Napoleon to test the political atmosphere.

He and

Otto learned from Montgelas that the Bavarians desired an
alliance only if it led to peace, for their fear of war was
great.

In return for the vague promise of a questionable

force of 30,000 Bavarian soldiers, Max Joseph wanted
subsidies and land compensation, namely Austrian Swabia and
the mountainous Tyrol and Innvertiel to the south.42
Montgelas desired the alliance, but he was unsure of Max
Joseph; "I cannot hope to make a hero of a prince who has
not the necessary disposition."43

He feverishly worked on

the elector for a decision; Max Joseph only hesitated.
His course decided, Napoleon leaned harder, giving his
assurances that all would be well. He earnestly desired to
support Max Joseph, and he was agreeable to the terms for
alliance.

Though perched on the cool shores of the English

Channel and thirsting to invade the British isles, Napoleon

42
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Quoted in Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic
Imperialism, 334. Two letters from Gravenreuth, the first
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Montgelas of the desperate nature of the situation. "In
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upon your Highness that the occupation of Bavaria will be on
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devotion I cannot hide from my prince that he must of
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See also Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 98-100.
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nonetheless exhibited the desire to go to Bavaria if
necessary to assure Max Joseph that it was in France's best
interests to support the needs of Bavaria.

"Write...to

Otto," the French Emperor instructed a busy Talleyrand, "so
he can persuade them that I have the same intentions.1,44

To

Cetto he announced:
Assure his serene highness in the first letter you
send to Munich, that in earnest of the interests and
friendship which bind me to him I will do eveything
that may be agreeable to him. I will defend his House
everywhere, and on every occassion that presents itself
I will secure it all possible advantage.
Even with a decision imperative the Bavarian elector
balked. With the French Emperor and his closest advisor
encouraging haste, Max Joseph nevertheless moved
ponderously, dragging on until June.

On June 9, 1805, Otto,

to whom much of the credit for French success in foreign
affairs in 1804 and 1805 should go, finally recieved a
tentative affirmation of the alliance.

Max Joseph had

decided to side with France despite his fear that they would
end up fighting Austria, Russia, and even Prussia.

The

exact terms were not settled until the end of the month, and
even then the elector wavered before the pressure of
Austrian threats and counter-proposals.

44

Napoleon to Talleyrand, April 7, 1805, Correspondance
de Napoleon Ier, Vol X, no, 8,536, (Paris: Henri Plon,
1868) .
45

Napoleon to Cetto, May 28, 1805, quoted in Deutsch,
The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism, 335.
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Secretly signed by Otto and Montgelas (though not fully
ratified) on July 31, 1805, the Franco-Bavarian alliance
called for 20,000 Bavaria soldiers to supplement the Grande
Armee when and if it would arrive.

In return, the French

would supply guidance and subsidies to reform the Bavarian
military.

Certain principalities would become Bavarian

spoils should war with Austria materialize.46

An exasperated

Napoleon declared repeatedly "j'approuve le traite
d'alliance,"

and warned Otto, Talleyrand, and especially

Cobenzl of Austria that if the Hapsburgs would not back
down, "je serai moi-meme avec 200,000 hommes en Baviere."47
He immediately sent General Henri Bertrand to Munich,
ostensibly to help mobilize the Bavarian army to take part
in Napoleon's rapidly developing plan of attack, though
Bertrand's immediate duty was to scout out the terrain and
make himself available to Montgelas and General von Triva.48
The effect of the alliance on neighboring minor states was
immediate. Following Bavaria's lead, an equally recalcitrant
Wiirttemberg joined France.

The rest of southern Germany

soon followed.

46

Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 98-99;
Princes, 98.

d'Arenberg, Lesser

47
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All this had been carefully masked from Austria, but
the War of the Third Coalition was, in Francis' mind,
already a reality. The declaration of war would be a simple
formality.

Unaware of the recently signed Franco-Bavarian

treaty, he took a foolish step.

Austrian Counts

Schwarzenberg and Buol-Schauenstein arrived in Munich the
first week of September with an ominous ultimatum from
Vienna.

Bavaria must immediately return the property of the

knights, allow Austrian troops under General Karl Mack von
Leiberich to cross the Inn, and supplement his force with
all available Bavarian troops. Francis "encouraged" Max
Joseph by alluding to the ancient friendship of their
houses.49

While Schwarzenberg was all bluster, Buol-

Schauenstein offered money, the city of Salzburg, and
recognition of the royal crown to Max Joseph in return for
an alliance.

Neither offer was serious, for as they spoke

Mack's white-coated Austrians were at that time crossing en
masse the bridges of the Inn and clogging the roads toward
Munich.

In one swift move Austria had gone from aggrieved

patron to criminal violator of the sacred German

49

Schwarzenberg, Karl Fiirst, Feldmarsahll Fiirst
Schwarzenberg, Der Sieger von Leipzig, (Munich: Verlag
Herold, 1964) 85, 466 fn 140. Francis threatened in an
almost amiable tone; "Mon cher Prince, abouches-vous demain
matin avec le minstre bon de Montgelas, il vous dira mes
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constitution.

By invading, Francis became the aggressor.

Napoleon, as he wished, could declare Francis in violation
of his own law, and he could conduct the war on the pretense
of defending German liberty.
In a moment of sheer panic, Max Joseph and his wife
fled north-west to Wiirzburg with Montgelas, Hompesch, and
others in tow.
behind.

The various divisions of his army trailed

Buol-Schauenstein followed, continuing to ask for

an Austro-Bavarian agreement.

At this point even Otto began

to despair; "We have against us the timidity of the prince,
the nobility, and the court, and particularly the tears of
Madame the Electrice. "50 Talleyrand, however, radiated
confidence.
Otto.

All that was needed was time, he replied to

He ordered the harried French ambassador to instruct

Max Joseph to "feign coldness" and keep the Austrians
guessing.

Napoleon was in the field and the Grande Armee

was rushing south-east from the Cherbourg coast.

"At least

this procedure will incline Austria to circumspection.

The

tardiness of her measures may gain a few days and that is
all that is necessary."51

50

Quoted in Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic
Imperialism, 354. Though he liked Montgelas, Otto had no
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troops. I have to do with the most feeble, the most timid,
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Though seldom brilliant in the conduct of foreign
affairs, Montgelas rose to the occasion.

Even as Austrian

troops entered and plundered Munich, as Napoleon's seven
army corps sped across France in a race for the Rhine, as a
sickly Max Joseph oscillated between Austria and France,
hoping for succour from French troops, Montgelas hit upon a
superb plan.

Crown Prince Ludwig had just finished a

journey through France and currently resided at Lausanne in
French-held Switzerland.

With this in mind, Montgelas

instructed Max Joseph to send a false letter to Francis
stating that if Bavaria joined the Austrians, Napoleon
threatened to imprison and maybe execute the elector's son
and heir.

To complete the plan, Montgelas chose as his

emissary the Governor of Munich, Count Nogarola, who was
completely unaware of the French treaty and believed that
Bavaria would soon make common cause with Austria.

He would

remain on call in Vienna to convey subsequent messages to
Francis .52
The delay worked.

Marshal Bernadotte's French troops

arrived in Wiirzburg on September 26, 1805.

The arrival of

the blue-coated Frenchmen forced Max Joseph to ratify the
Franco-Bavarian alliance.

In due course, a surprised

Nogarola was informed of the event and he in turn informed
Francis.

52
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believe him. "Either they have permitted themselves a bad
joke with you," Francis told Nogarola, "or it is you who
wishes to do this to me."53

When Nogarola finally convinced

him that the Franco-Bavarian alliance was reality, Francis
flew into a rage. "Je ne veux pas prendre la Baviere, je
veux la manger!"54

The die had been cast, however, and

elements of the Grande Armee swarmed into Bavaria. In a
lightning campaign, Napoleon surrounded and captured Mack
and most of his army at Ulm.

The remaining Austrian forces

fell back behind the Inn to attempt to link up with a
Russian army under Marshal Kutuzov approaching from the
east.

Bavaria had been saved once more.
Napoleon loudly proclaimed his arrival in Bavaria.

He

encouraged the Bavarian army; "You are fighting for the
first goods of the nation, for independence and political
existence!"55 To the apprehensive elector he declared that he
would soon be arriving in Munich, pleasantly requested Max
Joseph to meet him there, and assured him that France would
continue to protect him as it had just done.56
clear.

The point was

France had solved Bavarian foreign policy with

military force and diplomatic action; these events would
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have an indelible impact on the internal reorganization of
Bavaria.

As French power supplanted that of the of the

Reich Montgelas' possibilities of reform expanded radically.

Ill
Bavarian Internal Reforms, 1799-1806

Stuart Woolf remarks that of all the Napoleonic
satellites, only Bavaria and the principality of Neuchatel
had been free from recent political disruption at the dawn
of the Empire.57

Certainly this changed with the advent of

the Montgelas period.

While externally Bavaria continued to

suffer from her second-rate position in European affairs,
internally the engine of bureaucracy was sputtering to life.
During Max Joseph's first tumultuous six years,
Montgelas secured his position by frequently reorganizing
his weapon for reform, the executive ministries.

Montgelas'

goal, the creation of functional, streamlined bureaucratic
structures, would require smoothly functioning bureaus,
resembling those of Prussia.

The February 25, 1799 decree,

creating the four executive ministries of the
Staatsconferenz, relieved existing government bureaus of all

57

Wolff, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 85.

72

duties without exception.58

The ministries assumed full

control of all government functions.

Though other boards

and assemblies would be created during the first year, the
official boundaries of the ministries were not set until May
26, 1801.

Therefore, for the first two years, the

ministers, with Montgelas directing, took whatever actions
were necessary to encourage reform.

Implied in the

reorganization of the Staatsconferenz was that at any time,
due to the deaths of ministers Hompesch senior, Baron von
Hertling, Hompesch junior, and then Morawitzky, jurisdiction
over the affairs of their ministries would invariably go to
Montgelas.

Indeed, after 1806 he had control of

ecclesiastical affairs and justice as well as foreign
affairs.59

Though the others undoubtedly contributed to the

reforms, it is clear to whom the majority of credit or blame
should go.
Legislation in the democratic sense did not take place
in Max Joseph's Bavaria.

Electoral edicts were ratified by

a rather informal body known as the Geheimerat, or Conseil
d'Etat. This body consisted of three ministers, as often as
not the executive ministers of the Staatsconferenz, and
their respective groups of consultant advisors.

It was

58
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their task to edit the wording of the electoral edicts, but
they could not issue laws without the consent of the
elector.

The body met regularly but was without written

guidelines, so its performance is difficult to assess.

For

the most part, it simply seconded the ideas of the
Staatsconferenz. The dissolution of the Geheimerat in 1806
to await further reconstruction illustrates its general lack
of vitality.60
Juridic power remained a persistent problem for
Montgelas.

Judicial authority rested with two bodies and

was intensely associated with administrative duties.

The

first, the Generallandesdirektion under President Joseph
August von Torring-Gronsfeld (1753-1826), was created by the
decrees of April 23 and October 5, 1799.

Von Torring led

two vice-presidents and 42 councillors. This administrative
body combined a very simple court system, a police
authority, and executive power, subdivided into seven
separate sections.61

A second, smaller

Generallandesdirektion guided affairs in the Palatinate
until its absorption by France.

The second organization,

the landrichte, embodied the administrative bureaucracy
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Montgelas so desired to establish.

The landrichte came into

being after the abolishment of all previous offices and
bureaus on March 24, 1802.

In their place the new bureaus

of the landrichte would have first jurisdiction over all
civil cases and in some instances criminal proceedings.

All

police functions moved from the Generallandesdirektion to
the landrichte, including criminal "instruction" and
gathering court fines.
Awkward as it was, the judicial system remained in
place during the early years, but was one of Montgelas'
least successful changes.

The bureaucracy tied directly to

the judicial power, on the other hand, became a great
success.

Montgelas' dreams of forwarding the administration

on the shoulders of competent, qualified men functioned both
through the landrichte and the generallandesdirektion. The
multifarious bureaus of the 18th-century disappeared and
were replaced by a slowly accelerating modern system.

The

dienstpragmatik, the edict of January 1, 1805, solidly
reinforced the bureaucracy by suppressing all sales of
offices or titles and set the requirements and prerequisite
qualifications for civil service.62

Montgelas listed the

qualifying terms of employment as "...ceux de sa famille,

62
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ses annees de service, ses qualites morales et
intellectuelles. "63
With the help of the newly-created bureaus, the
ministers of the state set to work in changing the
religious, military, and economic conditions of the state.
While the military remained in relatively poor shape until
after 1805 and the economy would not be greatly affected
during the first five years, Bavarian Catholics endured the
trauma of a long-delayed "reformation."

The assault on the

Catholic preeminence in Bavaria roughly parallels the
foreign affairs of the state.

Lands annexed by Bavaria as

part of the Reichsdeputation and by the terms of Austria's
surrender in 1805 contained many Protestants;

Montgelas had

to initiate reforms of some kind to integrate the new
subjects.

But unlike the long path to the Franco-Bavarian

alliance, Montgelas' policy was planned before the arrival
of Napoleonic troops.
Reducing Catholic power in Bavaria was not an entirely
new idea.

Both Max Joseph III and Karl Theodor attempted

minor reforms.

The Roman Catholic Church had been somewhat

restrained by the Ems Punktation of 1786, which terminated
the power of future papal bulls and eliminated appeals to
the Holy See.64

Montgelas' was a vastly accelerated policy.
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The period of 1799 to 1805 saw distinct, major advances on
behalf of the Protestants and prophetic assurances for the
improvement of Jewish rights.

Just as in government reform,

these years produced incredible changes which would be
codified into law during the Empire period.

Unlike the

trial-and-error reform of the administration, nearly all the
changes in favor of the Protestants and the secularization
of church possessions would be complete before 1805.
The battle was not as difficult as one might imagine.
Although the innate conservatism of the small, rural town
and the agricultural poor bred unyielding attitudes toward
Protestants and Jews, resistance was disorganized and
without able leadership.

When faced with a determined

administration, the relative strength of the Catholics was a
mere facade, encouraged by wealthy bishops and fostered
daily by the efforts of monks and nuns, hidden behind feastdays, holy days, and the maintenance of church-sanctioned
superstitions.

As Montgelas publicly declared;

One of the most powerful obstacles is to be found
in the present condition of the Bavarian monasteries,
and more especially of the mendicant monks. They
recognize themselves that the new spirit of the age has
led to a change in public attitude toward them; but
this has only led them to redouble their efforts to
work for their own preservation. They have encouraged
the perpetuation of superstition and of the most
baneful errors; they have built up obstacles against
the spread of enlightened principles; and they have

77

sown suspicion against every institution working

for

true moral education.65
Montgelas sought to end the superstitions encouraged by
Catholic traditions.

Such myths included the ringing of

church bells before thunderstorms, which caused riots, the
firing of muskets into the air before storms or in times of
celebration, which caused injuries, and the unsound
abhorrence of breast-feeding among Catholic mothers, which
caused higher infant mortality rates.

Peasant pilgrimages

to sacred shrines were cause for riots and revelry,
disrupting trade and commerce, not to mention that citizens
were frittering away constructive working hours in useless
activities.66

Protestant work ethics, which many of the new

ministers held, demanded more of the people, and the
philosophes of the Enlightenment encouraged the abolition of
medieval practices in a modern state.
Opposition to the changes lay rooted in the gentry and
the bishops.

With their lands rapidly dwindling or being

appropriated wholesale by the new government, the failing
aristocracy saw the destruction of traditional Catholic
power as one more attack upon themselves.

On May 31, 1800,

Baron von Kern, as spokesman for the nobles, addressed the
assembly of the landschaftverordnete. A bitter foe of
65
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Montgelas whom he considered a foreigner, Kern announced
that the dissolution of church lands constituted the gravest
threat to the state.
Our old constitution is to be replaced by an
arbitrary despotism, a system which destroys but cannot
construct, a system which is not represented by native
officials but by birds of passage and parvenu
unpropertied spinners of projects. Our immediate
objective must be the confirmation by the prince of the
old standische liberties as part of the traditional
ceremony of homage. This is not a matter of going
back to old forms--under which, incidentally, prince,
stande, and subjects were far happier, united and
prosperous than they are likely to be under any new
dispensation--but rather a matter of maintaining an
existing constitution of acknowledged excellence.67
Kern's plea went unheard.

No champion of the

aristocracy had the power to step forward, and the Reich was
impotent.

The bishops, who naturally fought Max Joseph's

policies, were also easily bypassed.

The elector simply

waited for the deaths of these elderly officials and then
did not allow Rome to replace them, effectively beheading
the Catholic leadership in Bavaria.
Bavarian religious policy of the electoral years
contains three major themes.

The first two--secularization

of church lands, such as monasteries and abbeys, and the
removal of Catholic authority--go hand in hand.

Prior to

1802, only the threat of religous reform existed, but as the
need to reorganize the backward school system increased so
did the peril to the mendicant orders who, for the most
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part, controlled their day to day operation. By unpublished
edict, January 25, 1802, Max Joseph authorized the third
part of the reform program, the suppression of all mendicant
orders.68
directly.

Montgelas, Morawitzky, and Zentner went to work
All ecclesiastical power over education

disappeared, to be replaced by a state system of schools
which, like the administration, would undergo frequent
changes.

The Augustinians, Dominicans, Capuchins,

Franciscans, and others lost all rights to land and
edifices.

Most buildings were abruptly torn down to pave

the way for schools and, rarely, new Protestant churches.
The land was sold or redistributed in a manner reminiscent
of England's Henrician Reformation.

Money from these sales

went either directly to state coffers or education funds.
Nuns, friars, and monks were pensioned off.

Some were

allowed regular salaries if they went to work for Catholic
priests.

In this instance, Bavarian action presented

Napoleon with a fait accompli; it was not until the end of
the Reichsdeputation in February of the following year that
Napoleon sanctioned such policy.69
Unfortunately, this disruptive event did not occur
peacefully or without waste.

Treatment of the displaced

monks was at times barbaric.

Popular protest at their
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removal was feared, by the government, so frequently the
mendicants were rushed out by Bavarian soldiers in the
middle of the night.

The nuns of the abbey at Anger were

moved during a violent thunderstorm.
snow and bitter cold.

Some had to endure

In addition, vast libraries protected

for centuries by the thorough mendicants were seized and
Zentner, for one, allowed some of them to be sold to Munich
to be turned into pasteboard.™

Though pensions were

promised and the monks were encouraged to work with the
local priests as assistants, many turned full-time to
begging.

This practice became so prevalent that Max Joseph

issued an edict against it, March 13, 1802.

Five days

later, to fulfil his promised obligations, the elector
established a Commission of Secularization which outlined
the basis for pensions and salaries, a general pension
becoming law June 12, 1804.71
In combination with the secularization of church
property, Montgelas and Morawitzky employed other methods.
An order issued April 17, 1802 systematized the demolition
of old Catholic churches in parishes needing new local
schools.

Bishopric power was greatly trimmed in 1803 by a

series of government decisions, limiting clerical influence
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in government affairs.

Max Joseph's March 7, 1804 edict

declared that the church could no longer exist as a
standestaat, a state within a state, and that the Bavarian
administration could interfere in any and all religious
matters whenever it were deemed necessary.

Religious

interference in secular and state affairs was
correspondingly forbidden.72

There would be additional

changes in later years which further stripped the Catholics
of power.

However, during the electoral years Montgelas

employed a third method, one which limited Catholic power
indirectly and helped achieve a greater parity of
denominations in the state.
The third characteristic of Bavarian religious reform
was

the integration of the Protestants and to a much lesser

extent, the Jews.

Together with the new bureaucracy this

was the cornerstone of Montgelas' reform program.

An

anonymous memorandum at the palace dated April 10, 1799
reads "the need for religious toleration is necessary to
attract useful foreigners for industry and enlightenment."
The statement is attributed to the Savoyard minister.73
Montgelas' liberalism was thus not wholely altruistic.
Toleration was both necessary and beneficial.

He believed

that Protestants offered much for his country and, thus, for
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his lordship the elector.

In industry, commerce, education,

and morality, their inclusion as full citizens could only
enrich Bavarian economy and society.
preceded even Montgelas.

A few local leaders

Some rulers in recently annexed

lands already issued laws of toleration in favor of the
evangelical faith within their principalities.

For example,

Baron von Lindenfels of Ketzersdorf allowed all Protestants
full rights of law.74

Displaying his usual agressiveness,

Max Joseph created a private Protestant chapel in the court
for his dear Electress, Caroline of Baden in 1799.

The

first public announcement followed on April 8, 1800, when it
was announced that all Protestants in Munich could begin to
freely worship without the fear of Catholic reprisal.75

Due

to the relatively small number of Protestants in the
capital, this edict was mainly symbolic, but soon the
government's intentions became clear.

Even before the

ratification of the Reichsdeputation, edict after edict
opened windows of opportunity for aspiring Protestants.

In

August of the same year settlement in Bavaria was offered to
all non-Catholics, excepting Jews.

Montgelas stated...

Upon various occassions we have learned that many
cherish the erroneous opinion that the qualification of
the Catholic religion is a necessary condition to
settling in Bavaria. This has been down to the present
time of the greatest disadvantage to the encouragement
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of industry and agriculture in this country.76
A second decree, issued in November, 1800, declared
Protestant ministers henceforth free to hold services and
give educational instruction anywhere in the state, though
at this point it was still required to be done in private.
Full rights were extended by the extraordinary Edict of
Religious Freedom, January 10, 1803, which extended the
right for all Bavarians to freely worship as they wished
(excepting the Jews).

Children could now be educated in the

home and at church by Protestant ministers.

Marriages

between faiths were allowed in May, 1803 .77 These edicts
helped successfully integrate new citizens.

All subjects

finally enjoyed religious freedom on par with much of
Germany.
As Montgelas hoped, the impact on the economy was quick
to appear.

Large numbers of industrialists sought

opportunities in Bavaria's expanding market.

Often local

opposition forced the government enforce toleration.

One

Protestant entrepreneur, John Hochgesangt, desired to extend
his prosperous pottery firm to Amberg in Haut-Palatinate.
Demand for excellent Hochgesangt pottery was high in
Germany, and the addition of his ceramic factories would
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greatly boost Bavarian commerce.

His purchase of factory

sites in Amberg was, however, blocked by a recalcitrant
Catholic magistrate.

Montgelas' religious bureaus paved the

way for Hochgesangt to set up his kilns despite the local
resistance.

To their credit his factories did quite well.78

The cause of Jewish emancipation did not fare as well
as toleration of Protestants.

Despite the enlightened

attitude of Montgelas' administration, the six years of the
electorate saw little progress on behalf of Jews.

Though

Montgelas refers to them as somber, amiable, and content
with small profits from their businesses, he nonetheless
dedicated only three brief pages (out of twenty-six
concerning toleration) in his account of Bavarian internal
affairs.79

The deciding factor in all Jewish cases was often

whether or not the Jews in question would add value to the
Bavarian economy.

The situation of the widowed Jewess Sara

Schleierin, who wanted to give her son half her house so he
would be able to marry, epitomizes Bavarian attitudes.

The

district magistrate, Baron von Lichtenstern, would not allow
her to do so, declaring all Jews to be emissaries of fraud,
bankruptcy, usury, and the trade of stolen goods.80

The fact

that the government did not intercede on Scheierin's behalf
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as they did on behalf of John Hochgesangt and other
Protestant industrialists reveals the actual vein of early
toleration.

Scheierin did not offer any benefit to the

economy and was summarily written off.

The mixed marriages

act of 1803 showed that Bavarians were ready for Protestant
involvement in social as well as economic affairs, but Jews
were not yet welcome.
There was a glimmer of hope January 20, 1804, when,
perhaps urged by more lenient elements in the administration
led by Aretin, the government granted Jews admittance to
both higher and lower schools administered by the state.
Jewish freedom, however, would not come until the period of
the Confederation.

Furthermore, the reality of the laws,

however superficially benevolent, was always by reason
subject to and limited by the ingrained German prejudices
against Jews.
Religious toleration characterizes the most ambitious
aspect of reform during the electoral period.

Other

successes included the creation of the new administration,
and the modern bureaus laid the groundwork for the
codification of the royal period.

Land reform was pushed

forward to some degree, but not nearly as it would be during
the early years as a kingdom.

Economics was affected by the

immigration of sizable numbers of Protestant investors and
businessmen, and commerce was streamlined by the removal of
the irregular and frequent boundaries of the pfleger and
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rentamer. On the whole, however, Max Joseph had not been in
control long enough yet to make a significant impact on the
economy of the state.
Most of these measures illustrate solely the success of
Montgelas and his administrators in pursuing their goal of a
modern bureaucratic state.

Napoleon's impact was restricted

to the inclusion of new lands, which entailed greater leeway
in land distribution and consolidation and a greater
necessity for toleration to appease and seduce increasing
numbers of Protestants to the area.

The 1805 alliance

announced a new era and a transformation of Franco-Bavarian
interaction.

Chapter 3

Anchor of the Mittelstaat:
Bavaria as part of the Rhine Confederation

"Bavaria is engaged in a total revolution, though
bloodless. The past is demolished and a new order of
things founded."
--Anselm von Feuerbach, 18081
The years 1805 to 1812 marked the zenith of the
Napoleonic Empire.

These same years would see the further

evolution of the Bavarian state.

Max Joseph and Montgelas

would legitimize the kingdom's existence with a
constitution, solidify its borders by reorganization, and
preserve its independence with a new, modern army based on
the French model.
be limited.

French involvement in the process would

Bavaria owed its inclusion as the premier state

of Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine not so much to the
astute diplomacy of her leaders as to continental forces
beyond her control.

However, the diligent work of Montgelas

during the period of the French empire would help to ensure
that when Napoleon's military success ended, Bavaria would
not slip back into the political morass from whence she had
struggled.

This period is therefore characterized by the

usually indirect influence of France on Bavarian affairs and
the codification of the modernization reforms by Montgelas'
administration.

Quoted in Klang, "Bavaria and the War of Liberation,"
39 .
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I
Bavaria and the Napoleonic Empire

The shattering defeat of the Austro-Russian allied army
at Austerlitz, December 2, 1805, did not officially end the
War of the Third Coalition, but it did conclude Austrian
participation.

Twice humiliated during the brief war and

defeated by France for the third time since the outbreak of
the French Revolution, Austria isolated herself to
reorganize.

Four years would pass before the Stadion's

belligerent War Party would send Austria down the path of
war once more.

During that time, the Hapsburgs, impotent

against France, dealt very little with Bavaria, much less
interfere in her affairs.

Thus, one of the major powers

which dominated Max Joseph's foreign policy could not, for a
time, upset progress in Munich.
The other major power, of course, was France.
Strangely enough Napoleon's direct impact on Bavaria,
finally safely under his wing, would last no more than a
year.

Before the Franco-Bavarian alliance Bavaria

frequently had to follow the French lead;

after 1806, she

would be more free to do as she needed and would not as
often require the assistance of the French Emperor.
Indirectly, however, French policy would continue to affect
Bavaria.

Once again many of the reforms Montgelas initiated

would owe their completion in part to actions taken by
Napoleon before the creation of the Confederation.
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Additionally, many of the changes Bavaria would experience
owed their existence to Imperial policy.

The economy, for

one, benefited from the strengthening of the Continental
System.
In 1806, however, the Corsican general had other
affairs to conclude, and the resolution of the idea for a
confederation was one of these.
be agreed upon first.

Austrian reparations had to

The price of this third defeat,

already costly in manpower and prestige, would be high.
Against Talleyrand's advice Napoleon decided to punish the
Hapsburgs harshly.

For the most part, mediatization and

compensation in the German minor states had heretofore been
at the expense of the ecclesiastical states and free
Imperial cities.
bereaved.

Austria would join the list of the

The Treaty of Pressburg, signed December 27,

1805, cost Francis Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, Venetia, and minor
parts of Illyria.

He renounced the allegiance of any

principalities or cities in the Franconian, Swabian, and
Bavarian circles.

Tyrol and the Vorarlberg went to Max

Joseph, who had to give up Wiirzburg to Austria in the
interests of consolidating borders.

In all,

Austria lost

2.5 million subjects, one-sixth of their annual revenue, and
was forced to pay 40 million francs in reparations.2

2

On the

Talleyrand argued forcefully against punishing Austria
further. He believed further humiliation would either break
the country up in to civil war or galvanize anti-French
forces in Vienna (which it did). "The Austrian monarcy is
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day of the treaty Napoleon sent word to Max Joseph,
congratulating him on his new acquisitions and reminding him
of his (Napoleon's) loyalty to the Wittelsbach fortunes.3
For their part, the Bavarians rejoiced at the news, but
not only because of the new acquisitions.

Upon Napoleon's

return to Munich he decided to further solidify the FrancoBavarian alliance through traditional means, a marriage.
Since 1804 Napoleon had hinted through Otto at the idea of
betrothing the young Augusta, daughter of Max Joseph and
Caroline, to his beloved and loyal stepson, Eugene de
Beauharnais, now the Viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy.
Indeed, while the French conqueror was in Munich Max Joseph
secretly escorted Augusta to Napoleon's quarters for his
approval.

Napoleon, in his own words, was "embarassed" but

composed of various states which differ among themselves in
language, traditions, religion, and composition. They have
a single thing in common; one and the same sovereign. The
power of the monarchy is therefore weak, yet is is
sufficient and a necessary obstacle to the barbarians.
Austria is now defeated and humiliated. Its conqueror must
now extend a generous hand and, by making it an ally, restor
to it that confidence in itself of which it may be deprived
by this series of defeats and disasters... It is now in the
power of your majesty to destroy the Austrian monarchy or to
raise it up. If you choose to destroy it, it will no longer
be in your power to make the pieces whole again, and the
existence of this monarchy is necessary, indispensible, to
the future security of civilization." Quoted in Jack
Bernard, Talleyrand: A Biography, New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1973, 262-264.
3
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agreeable.4

The Wittelsbach elector was uncertain of this

course, arguing that Eugene was only a step-son and not a
son by birth, but in the end he relented, much to the
delight of Napoleon and Josephine.

The marriage was a very

successful one and in time Eugene and Max Joseph became
close friends, even after the fall of Napoleon.
A second event superseded excitement over the impending
marriage.

On December 12, 1805, by French and Bavarian

declaration, the Kingdom of Bavaria was created and
Maximilian Joseph I became its first King.

Frederick of

Wiirttemberg followed suit in a few days; Karl August of
Baden became a Grand Duke.

All were for the time being to

remain part of the Holy Roman Empire.
shattered to resist.

Austria was too

Indeed, one of the terms of Pressburg

was that he had to recognize the new royal titles.

Prussia,

desperately seeking a peaceful method to deal with French
aggression, declined to object.

A great step in the quest

for legitimacy had been taken.

Though Max Joseph's powers

overtly would not change, the dignity of the title did much
to embellish Bavarian prestige.

The new monarch celebrated

the restoration of Bavaria's ancient royal dignity by asking
all Bavarians to wear blue and white cockades, borrowing

4
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from French popular symbolism.5

Logically, the next step

would be the Confederation.
As the new year began, this idea dominated affairs in
Germany, and Prussia began to become concerned.

Prussian

leaders, astutely aware that Napoleon's weight could very
well shift their way, scrambled for solutions.

A Prussian

plan for a loose federation centered on the houses of
Hapsburg, Wittelsbach, and Hohenzollern was debated, but
Bavaria was never formally notified of its existence.
Prussia thus assumed condescending airs toward Munich.
Frederick Wilhelm III had not argued against Max Joseph's
coronation, but neither did he allow Bavaria equal
consideration as a full-fledged monarchy.

This attitude

would help stale relations between the two and help ruin
Prussia's negotiating position.
Meanwhile, other Germans proposed different,
conflicting ideas.

Karl Dalberg, the Arch-Chancellor of the

German Empire in Mainz, had wheedled and cajoled his way
into a profitable position as Napoleon's most ardent German
supporter.

Though he clamored for Napoleon to accept the

Holy Roman crown in the early months of 1806, he soon
abandoned this in favor of a confederation.

At Dalberg's

insistence many of the minor princes appealed to Napoleon to
protect them as he had Bavaria in 1805.

5

Some of them needed
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protection even from Bavaria and her neighbors.

In

particular, King Frederick of Wiirttemberg's continued
encroachment on neighboring lands caused bickering among the
minor states.

His actions led Napoleon to believe that some

of these states, angered by Frederick's naked aggression,
may well declare in favor of Austria against France's German
allies should some vote come up in the Imperial Diet.
solution was essential.

A

The German reformers continued to

produce various partisan ideas.

Through May and June of

18 06 different plans were submitted by Minister Reitzenstein
of Wiirttemberg for the further mediatization of the few
remaining minor principalities in southern Germany.

Envoys

from Bavaria and Baden perused these plans and rejected
them, submitting their own designs.

The southern German

states could not agree on how to complete the rounding out
of their borders.6

It was clear France would have to

resolve the issue herself.
On May 22, 1806, Talleyrand, always a proponent of a
confederation, presented Napoleon with a memorandum,
querying the Emperor for a decision.

Talleyrand asked three

questions: should the princes be allied to one another,
guaranteeing each other's rights and privileges; would there
be a mandatory troop allotment for the defence of any
confederation and if so, how many soldiers would be required

6
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of each country; and should certain minor territories such
as Baden, Hesse-Cassel, or Nassau be absorbed into a larger
polity or left as sovereign states?7
swiftly.

Napoleon responded

On June 11, ambassador Cetto was informed of a

tentative plan for confederation.

Bavaria, like the other

states, would declare full sovereignty, separate from the
Holy Roman Empire.

All would band together in a

confederation allied with France.

Three vague councils

would decide the needs of the confederation.

The most

important council, headed by Dalberg, would be "the Council
of Kings," of which Bavaria would be the most important
member.

Napoleon would be the "Protector" of the

confederation and Dalberg would be the "Prince-Primate."

In

the first draft both were accorded many powers, so many that
Cetto, on behalf of Max Joseph, refused to sign.8
A lively exchange ensued.

Napoleon needed Bavarian

support. His insistance upon Bavaria's ratification
illuminates Bavaria's standing among the German minor
states.

If Max Joseph would agree to the confederation, the

others would sign, just as they had done with the alliance
treaties in 1805.

Napoleon therefore ordered Talleyrand to

step up the pressure and get the signatures one way or
another.

Talleyrand allowed Cetto to be the only ambassador

7

d'Arenberg, Lesser Princes, 130.

&

Ibid., 134.

95

from any of the German states to see the rough draft.

After

studying the document, Cetto announced that leaving the Holy
Roman Empire was agreeable to Bavaria but that Dalberg
seemed to have too much power.

The Fundamental Statutes,

which would be drawn up by Dalberg to govern the meetings of
the confederation, should be completed by Dalberg and then
examined by Bavaria before the treaty could be ratified.
Talleyrand, following his master's orders, pressed Cetto to
sign.

Where diplomacy failed, duplicity succeeded.

Emulating the style employed by Montgelas against Francis in
18 05, the French refused to allow Cetto to speak with anyone
and Gravenreuth, who was shuttling Cetto's messages to and
from Bavaria, was told that the treaty was signed.

By the

time Gravenreuth discovered otherwise and hastened back to
Paris with orders to delay, Cetto had given in.9

As

Napoleon suspected, the other German states, none of which
disliked the idea in theory but none of which were truly
ready for a French-sponsored confederation, reluctantly
followed Bavaria's lead.
July 12, 1806, Napoleon dissolved the Holy Roman Empire
and with sixteen German princes formed the Confederation of
the Rhine.

Karl Dalberg became the Duke of Frankfort and

the Prince-Primate (article I & II), Napoleon was named the

9
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"Protector" of the Confederation (article XII), and the many
territorial squabbles came to an end.

All present borders

were to be maintained (article VI), and future changes would
be dealt with by the three councils under Dalberg's
leadership (articles XIII to XV).

The royal titles given to

Bavaria and Wiirttemberg would remain (article V) . The
greatest responsibility would be the military commitment,
which hinged on Article XXXV;
be war upon them all.

war declared on France would

Bavaria's contribution to the

100,000-plus army was the largest, 30,000, though it will be
seen their contribution greatly surpassed that number.10
Francis, left with no recourse, abdicated August 1, 1806.
The Holy Roman Empire was no more.
It's replacment, the Confederation of the Rhine, was at
heart an extension of Napoleon's war-making capacity, both a
military buffer against Prussia and Austria and a willing
ally in the blockade against Britain.

The involvement of

its members states, like the French satellites of Holland,
Westphalia, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the Kingdom of
Italy, entailed much more than simple military obligations.
Through his new nobility and bureaucracy, Napoleon was
attempting to spread the ideas of the French Revolution to
all the countries under his influence.

10
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progress, equality, and "civilization" were injected into
the governments of French-allied states.

As Stuart Woolf

notes, how to integrate such ideas into a political body was
the central political problem of the Napoleonic Empire.11
Because of her importance as Napoleon's largest sovereign
ally, Bavaria enjoyed a degree of freedom from this
integration; freedom, however, had its costs.

Bavaria's

reward for becoming the premier ally of the French Empire
would be extensions of French "civilization": mandatory
participation in the Continental System, a new army, and
involvement in the 1809 and 1812 campaigns.

Note that these

measures are distinctly military; the Continental System was
simply another element of the trade war against Napoleon's
tenacious English antagonist.

Domestic issues, such as the

introduction of a bureaucracy based on merit, reform of
education, and the destruction of the established order had
already begun under Montgelas; no French initiative was
needed.

Of all the external impositions, the financial

changes imparted by the Continental System were perhaps the
most noteworthy and beneficial for Bavaria.

u
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Prior to the Continental System's debut, Montgelas'
ministries had done what it could to encourage fiscal
growth.

The problem was distressing.

Karl Theodor had left

the treasury bankrupt and a debt of over a million florins.
Minister of Finance Hompesch spent much of his time trying
to desperately salvage Bavaria's economy.

Based on reports

by the pollzeidirektor Hock in 1807, Bavarian taxes raised
17 million florins annually.

Probable yearly debits

numbered 6.8 million florins, though this figure is
uncertain.

Including pensions, benefices, and the costs of

rearing a new administration, the true amount was probably
much higher.

Many towns, in fulfilling their tax

requirements, had to dip into future budgets.

A French

agent noted that Bamberg and Ansbach had used up their money
for the next four years.12
Before his death in 1809 Hompesch diligently
reorganized state finances.

Proposing a plan inspired by

the work of Colbert and Gaudin of France, Hompesch suggested
a four part plan:

the abolition of pecuniary privileges,

the nationalization of tax control, the unification of land,
and the centralization and consolidation of the debt.

To

this end Hompesch wanted to "re-introduce order into the
manipulation of public moneys" and to refuse to invest in

12
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anything unnecessary and non-utilitarian.13

Though his

vision was admirable, his successes were limited.

Hompesch

cut the fat from royal spending, curtailing Max Joseph's
extravagant habits.

He kept tight control on the spending

of the Staatsconferenz and new bureaus, though he had little
jurisdiction over the smaller budgets of towns and cities.
Hompesch also fixed the salaries for the civil service
employees according to their occupation.14

Despite these

successes, much more, especially concerning taxation, was
needed.
Upon gaining direct control of finances in 1806,
Montgelas applied great force to reorganizing.

He further

modified the finance ministry and its subordinate bureaus,
streamlining them and assigning men of quality to important
fiscal posts.

In 1807 all internal tariffs were abolished.15

Compensation from secularization and land redistribution
lessened the fiscal burden, but much of the problem remained
in the outmoded tax system, which was not changed until
1808.

Previously, taxes had been levied according to the

hofhuss system of land assessment,

a holdover from the Holy

Roman Empire, based on the law of 1445.

Hofhuss rates were

levied based on the demands for ploughing of each

13
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agricultural field, measured by one peasant's average daily
output.

Because agriculture and population had changed

little in the centuries since its conception, the hofhuss
system remained in place.

Montgelas' revolution demanded a

better system to pay for the new army and to operate a
modern kingdom.

The units of land used in the hofhuss had

been adjusted in 1803 to increase revenue, but the system
was obsolete and had to be replaced.16
Montgelas' solution was a complete reorganization of
taxation.

New, geographically-contiguous areas were

created.

Called rentbeamte, their creation erased the

ancient pfleger and did away with the pflegerrichte system
of collecting taxes.

The rentbeamte's sole purpose was to

function as tax divisions, not as provinces or counties.
Taxes were to be collected based on the worth of the land,
assessed by the members of the Kreisfinanzdirektion.
Opposition from former pfleger and landed nobles delayed the
complete installation of this system until June 21, 1808,
when it was incorporated with the erection of fifteen formal
political kreise, each with a "governor" to oversee
taxation, laws and regulations, and the operation of the
smaller administrative bureaus.

In the interests of

tradition and heritage, Max Joseph attempted to win the
nobles by naming the kreise after local rivers and placing

16
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each "governor" in the largest city within each area.
Though similar to the French system of prefectures, they
were not an imitation and differed in terms of judicial
jurisdiction and military commitments.

They did not contain

sub-prefects nor did they mirror the system of arrondisement
and baillis .ll These simplifications were cleaning measures,
designed to help the state economy function smoothly.
However, Bavarian economy and its latent industrial base
would truly grow only under the impact of Napoleon's
Continental System.
The causes of the blockade of British goods are well
documented.

After Trafalgar, Napoleon was without a navy to

challenge British dominance on the high seas.

Therefore he

resorted to a massive economic war, hoping to strangle the
British into submission.

Initiated with the Berlin Decree,

November 21, 1806, Napoleon extended the system to all
allied states, conquered provinces, and vanquished foes
(Austria and Prussia) by three decrees in 1807.
the importance of this action.

Woolf notes

By blockading all British

goods and lowering her own tariffs to continental Europe,
France inaugurated a new economic era, encouraging direct
competition with her own markets, which were much less

17
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powerful than the dynamic British economy.

Continental

states could now sell their goods aggressively.

In

addition, by removing the generally despised British
commerial participation, the blockade provided shelter for
Germany's embryonic industrial base to grow and compete.18
The effects appeared quickly.

One of Napoleon's ministers

in Germany, Bacher, noted the changes.
The new direction which colonial goods take...is
stated to have created such activity on all roads
leading from different places in Russia and Prussia on
on side and through Poland and Moravia to Vienna on the
other, as also from the Turkish provinces to the
Austrian empire with regards to British goods
discharged in the Levantine Ports, that the Danube will
take the place of the Rhine, as the channel through
which the states of the Confederation of the Rhine
will in future provide themselves. The German
merchants consider that this...will lead to active new
connections between Russia, Austria, and Bavaria, and
consequently serve to create secure routes, which will
convey not only colonial goods to the Rhine, but also
British products, as far as the Confederation of the
Rhine.19
Trade with the Kingdom of Italy became conspicuously
important after the annexation of the Tyrol in 1806.
Merchants conveying goods from the Orient (and, albeit
covertly, from British colonies) entered ports along the
Italian peninsula and negotiated the Alps through passes
near Innsbruck.

When Napoleonic strictures on foreign trade

began to affect the Kingdom of Italy, they likewise began to

18

Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 28-29.

19

T. Bacher to Napoleon, October 2, 1810, quoted in Eli
F. Heckscher, The Continental System: An Economic
Interpretation, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922) 231-232.
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affect Bavaria.

A treaty concluded between Bavaria and

Italy, January 2, 1808, reduced tariffs between the two
states by a full fifty percent.

Upon learning of this

treaty, Napoleon dissolved it, fearful of the competitive
Bavarian wool-trade and of smuggled British goods entering
Germany through the Italo-Bavarian trade routes.

Woolf

asserts this breakdown encouraged the Tyrolese Revolt of
1809-1810 .20
Napoleon's insistent imposition of this system upon
allies and defeated foes alike led to a second, more
important development for Bavaria.

To humiliate and punish

Austria for her unanticipated attack on France in the 1809
campaign, Napoleon detached the important province of
Illyria and the port of Trieste from Hapsburg domains,
isolating Austria and keeping her land-locked.

From that

time a fundamental shift in trade between France and Asia
existed, most of the goods moving into Illyria by way of the
Ottoman land routes.

20

To formalize this policy, Napoleon

Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 148. The
Tyrolese revolt, led by the pious Catholic Andreas Hofer,
coincided with Archduke Charles appeal to Germany in 1809 to
join Austria in a "patriotic" war against France. The
revolt, spurred by the disrupted Italian trade, by the
secularization movement in Bavaria (Tyrol was heavily
Catholic), by popular resistance to the draft, and by
differences in nationality (Tyrolese were a proud "Gothic"
mixture of Lombard and German), caused a great deal of
humiliation for Max Joseph, especially when his army had
such trouble dealing with it. When finally defeated, Hofer
fled to Venice, where he was betrayed to the authorities.
He was later executed. See Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 198204 and Rambaud, L'Allemagne sous Napoleon Ier, 308-330.
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established a new trade route for goods from the Far East
and the Levant (land-based because of French inability to
control the Mediterranean Sea).

No longer would important

commerce from the Orient pass through Austria by way of the
Danube valley.

From November 12, 1810, goods were to be

transported solely through the Turkish provinces of Serbia
and Bosnia to Illyria and (for goods bound for Italy or
Southern France) to Venice or (for goods bound for the
Confederation of the Rhine, the Low Countries, or northern
France) to Innsbruck in Bavarian annexed Tyrol.21
In combination with the religious toleration which
allowed enterprising Protestants into Wittelsbach lands, the
result was an essential growth in Bavarian commerce.

Among

the first to benefit from the reduction of the volume of
British colonial goods was the sugarbeet trade.
Betteraveries, factories for producing beetsugar, sprang up
all over Bavaria and southern Germany.

Bavarian beetsugar

rapidly and efficiently replaced colonial sugar throughout
the Confederation.
in major cities.

Tobacconists established cigar factories
The most important European commercial

activity, textiles, grew tremendously in Bavaria, centered
at Augsburg.

Woolens had long been important to the local

market; wool producers, uniting with cotton manufacturers,
soon began to compete with major textile works in France.

21

Woolf Ibid., 153.
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Ceramic production, led by John Hochgesangt, became
important for export throughout Central Europe.22
The repercussions of the Continental System cannot be
underestimated.

It radically altered Bavarian industry and

consequently her economy in ways that Montgelas, despite his
zeal for reform, could never have accomplished.

Bavaria

began to produce goods not only for herself but also for
export on a large scale.23 Though the imposition of the
Continental System's laws survived only as long as Napoleon,
the long-term effect was the birth of modern Bavarian
industry on a completely new scale.

In the short-term,

coupled with Protestant investment and administrative
reform, the blossoming economy enabled Bavaria to comply
with another important French demand, a larger, reorganized

22

Dunan, Napoleon et 1'Allemagne, 2 90-2 96; Woolf,
Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 145-147; Roger Dufraisse,
LrInfluence de la Politique Economique Napoleonienne sur
1'Economie des Etats du Rheinbund, in Eberhard Weis and
Elisabeth Muller-Luckner, Reformen in Rheinbundischen
Deutschland, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984) 78-81, 85.
23

Bavaria was unable, however, to produce all the goods
she needed. Many manufactured items, including steel (with
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and because the blockade was nearly impossible to enforce
throughout Europe, smuggling became a popular and prosperous
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Integration of Europe, 150-153 and particuliarly Roger
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military, a requirement that would tax Bavaria's financial
successes to the limit.
If the eighteenth-century army was a monarch's best
expression of his royal might and prestige, it assuredly
reflected poorly on the Bavaria of Karl Theodor.

The

beleaguered Bavarian treasury, stretched to the limits by
Karl Theodor's extravagance and waste, had difficulty
maintaining a force greater than 10,000 men.24

Rank and file

consisted of peasant levies, prisoners, a few mercenaries,
and a few career soldiers, usually among the noncommissioned officers.

The officers, of course, were nobles

appointed by the elector, frequently without merit.

Count

Rumsford had enacted some reforms, namely doing away with
the elegant uniforms, which in the eighteenth century were
the gentlemanly measure of state honor.

Rumsford

distributed plain, single-piece white coats to reduce costs.
He also introduced some new artillery pieces, called
disparagingly "Rumsford 3-pounders. "25

In the Wars of the

First and Second Coalitions, Bavaria's impotent position as
a minor pawn relegated its ineffective army to support roles
for much larger and more professional Austrian and Russian
forces.

24

Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 147.

25

Haythornethwaite, The Napoleonic Sourcebook, 142-143.
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Acting with his usual verve and heartily supported by
Wrede, von Triva, and Crown Prince Ludwig, Montgelas sought
to make the army capable of defending his new state.

Though

great fiscal exertions were required to pay for the muskets,
horses, uniforms, and equipment, Montgelas succeeded in
fielding a modernized army.

Imitating the civil service

requirments, officers were henceforth promoted or assigned
on basis of meritorious service.

Aware that these men

lacked experience and esprit de corps, Max Joseph created in
1805 the Bavarian l'ecole des Cadets. Modeled on the French
school at Saint-Cyr,

Bavarian officers would go there for

training, often by French instructors.26

Keeping with the

spirit of martial elegance during these years, the War
Ministry issued new cornflower blue uniforms with red
facings.

Bavarian infantry wore a distinctive, high-crowned

black leather shako known as a raupenhelm. Thus Bavarian
foot soldiers were distinctive on the battlefield, virtually
the only nation of the allied contingent of Napoleon's
Grande Armee to forego adopting a French-cut uniform.27
The field organization of the new army, however, was
distinctly French.

Max Joseph petitioned Napoleon for a

French general to oversee the reorganization.

Napoleon's

envoy would be General Henri Bertrand, his later companion

26

Dunan, Napoleonet l'Allemagne, 90.

27

Haythornethwaite, The Napoleonic Sourcebook, 143-144.
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on St. Helena.

Bertrand arrived in 1805 and aided the

Bavarian military with their reorganization, forming 57
battalions of infantry, 36 squadrons of cavalry, and 4
artillery batteries.

All were organized into brigades,

divisions, and corps on the French model so that they might
be more easily integrated into the command and control
structure of the Grand Armee.28 It would remain for
Montgelas to fill these battalions.
With little money to spare the Savoyard minister
resorted to conscription.

Previously, in the era of limited

warfare prior to the advent of Napoleonic grand tactics and
total war, European armies consisted mainly of soldiers
recruited from the "dregs of society," inducted sometimes by
volunteering, sometimes by compulsion, and sometimes by
trickery.29

French innovations during the revolution, namely

mass conscription or levee en masse, revolutionized warfare.
Consequently soldiers could be drafted in large numbers
directly from the peasantry.

It was a cheap system by which

thousands of Frenchmen were herded into the ranks.

Other

European nations were slow to follow, their military leaders
incapable at first of contemplating the fundamental change
in warfare which had occurred and fearing the social impact

28

Montgelas, Denwurdigkeiten, 111-113; Dunan, Napoleon
et 1'Allemagne, 89; Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe,
61-62.
29
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of so many armed peasants. Eventually the need for large
armies to oppose Napoleon overrode their fears.
Bavaria followed suit, out of a different necessity.
The Confederation of the Rhine demanded a 30,000 man army
from Max Joseph, the largest contingent of the league.

In

compliance, Montgelas initiated conscription, announced by
electoral decree May 22, 1804.

For this purpose Bavarian

territory was divided into eleven military cantons.

The

police of each canton would be responsible for registering
all men ages 16 to 40 for eligibility in the military, with
certain exceptions.
years.30

If drafted, each man would serve ten

Through this new system of recruitment, Montgelas

surpassed the required 30,000 men, raising the number of
Bavarian soldiers to over 60,000 for the 1809 Danube and
1812 Russian Campaigns.
Unused to such measures, the poor denounced the draft.
With all the exceptions given to other classes, they were
singled out for service.
popularity of the army.

Such policy did not improve the
Trietschke's description of the

fanfare and bravado among the ranks is not entirely

30

Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 148. Montgelas lists all
groups with special exception, both in terms of eligibility
and, if willing to serve, in length of service; nobles,
clergymen (of all religions), bourgeoisie, artisans, mine
workers, land-owners, Jews, and Mennonites. Exceptions were
raised with the Austrian invasion of 1809 and the 1812
campaign; Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 164.
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accurate.31

The soldiers' disaffection would show in

everyday military affairs.

G.W.F. Hegel recounts "an honest

townswoman recently assured everyone that, having had two
Russians in her house, she would prefer six French to one
such pig; on the other hand, she would prefer 3 Russians to
any of the 44 volunteers recently supplied by her own
city."32

Jerome Bonaparte, in command of Bavarian divisions

in the 1807 and 1809 campaigns, complained once that many of
their guards would fall asleep at night, resulting in large
numbers of them being surprised and captured by enemy
cavalry.33

After the 1812 debacle, when over 30,000 young

Bavarians died in the snows of Russia, public opinion turned
sour against France.

Nowhere was the change more clear than

among the new, reconstituted Bavarian divisions which took
the field in 1813.

Napoleon wrote Max Joseph to this

affect; "Je ne suis pas content de vos troupes; vous me
depensez beaucoup d'argent pour les bien equipes et elles
desertent du soir au matin."34

31

Trietschke, History of Germany, 1:417-418.

32

G.W.F. Hegel to Friedrich Niethammer, December 23,
1813, in G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel: The Letters, (trans, by Calrk
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33
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Nevertheless, on the battlefield itself the Bavarians
performed admirably, on par with the excellent Wiirttemberg
and Italian divisions.

Usually under the direct command of

either the Crown Prince or Feldmarschall Wrede, Max Joseph's
soldiers stood bravely under fire, advancing boldly against
enemy positions.

Bavarian divisions participated in all the

major campaigns after 1807, serving with particular
distinction on the bloody Marchfeld at the Battle of Wagram,
July 5-6, 1809.35

When studied for what it was, a

commitment to France in return for "protection", the new
army assumed its proper place in the general modernization
of Bavaria.

II
Bavarian Domestic Changes during the Empire

Not all of the Napoleonic demands were as heavy as the
military commitment.

35

Certain elements of Imperial policy

For more see David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of
Napoleon, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966) 728, and
Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military
Campaigns, (Wilmington:SR Books, 1987) 144-149- Chandler's
account of the Battle of Hanau, October, 1813, in which
Wrede prematurely attempted to block the retreat of the
French after Leipzig, illustrates the fighting capacity of
the Bavarians nicely. Though it may appear at first they
were defeated by rag-tag divisions made up of pitiful
survivors of the 1813 campaign, two things must be
remembered; Napoleon's performance as a general was nothing
short of brilliant during the post-Leipzig period, and the
Bavarian divisions were also survivors of the bitter
campaign. See Chandler, 937-938.
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were merely guidelines which allied states could interpret
as they wished.

Religious issues were one of these areas.

Bavaria's great degree of autonomy further weakened any
Imperial policy; Napoleon placed little importance on
Bavarian compliance with French religious policy.

Thus,

pursuant to the religious doctrine established by Montgelas'
administration during the electoral years, the 1805-1812
period witnessed a continued zeal for toleration.

For

purposes of legitimacy and order the "reformation" was
codified into law.

In most states of the Napoleonic Empire,

religion was frequently viewed solely in its political
aspects; personal piety or local beliefs held little
interest, especially for the military.

Out of touch in many

respects with the Catholic faith within France, Napoleon
nonetheless attempted to mitigate the indignation Catholics
felt toward the bitter days of the Revolution by signing the
Concordat with the Pope.

He instructed reformers in many

states to move cautiously so as not to alienate the populace
(the major exception, of course, being the military
bureaucracy in Spain).

On the whole, excepting the

mandatory mediatization of the ecclesiastical estates
demanded by Napoleon at the Treaty of Luneville, French
policy did not mirror the fervor for toleration in Bavaria.36

36

Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe, 206-215.

113

Where the Jews are concerned, however, Napoleon
attempted to create uniform policy.

Jews were considered by

most Germans to be more of an ethnic problem than a
religious one, and general European opinion was nearly
always against them.

Keeping with the policies of extending

French "civilization" to the occupied and allied
territories, Napoleon, himself somewhat anti-Semitic, issued
a set of restrictions on the Jews, May 30, 1806.

For a ten-

year duration, Jews were to undergo scrutiny by French
officials, restricting their ability to buy and sell, to
worship, and limiting their places of residence.

The goal

of these restrictions was to assimilate Jews in French
culture and to rid them of their "vices."

Similarly to

Bavaria, tests were administered to see which Jews were
"useful" in the fields of finance and business.

These

would, of course, be granted limited exceptions.37

For the

most part, these laws only took effect in the satellite
kingdoms and the annexed provinces.

They did, however, set

an acceptable tone for the remainder of the Empire.
Montgelas' administration continued to follow its own
course on religious reformation.

After shearing the

temporal power of the Catholics, it set about tailoring its
church-state policies.

Restrictions on the power of the

bishops were codified as time went on, specifically

37
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concerning civil and criminal cases, marriage and divorce,
and education.

As far as the Protestants were concerned,

most of their freedoms had already been granted before Max
Joseph's coronation as Bavaria's first king.
results have already been discussed.

The economic

The reforms made the

annexation of largely Protestant lands much easier and on
the whole were being accepted well in Bavarian towns.

The

book censor Westenrieder wrote in January 1809 that there
had been a great many Protestant funeral processions openly
seen in the city, something that simply did not occur before
1799.

The arrival of the Protestant nationalist Johann

Gottlieb von Herder in the Upper Palatinate aroused
considerable praise for the administration.38
All the legislation, electoral and royal, issued on
behalf of the Protestants and against the Catholics was
codified by the first Organic Law, issued March 24, 1809.
The edict enumerated all rights, public and private,
religious and secular, established by all prior edicts.
Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic churches were by law the
only recognized forms of Christian faith.
to one another were listed in detail.

Their relations

The Catholic church

was further restricted, though this would be the final
attack upon them;

no longer could they receive income in

any form (rents, taxes, or dues) derived from their

38
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ownership of remaining lands and estates; privileges,
dispensations, immunities, exemptions, and benefices were
all the purview of the state, not the Holy See or local
bishopric; marriages would henceforth be regulated by the
state though the ceremonies were to be administered by the
churches; and all criminal crimes, even if involving only
clergymen, would be tried by the royal courts.39
restrictions were enumerated and codified.

All prior

The 1809 Organic

Law was the penultimate act in the "Bavarian Refomation."
Jewish emancipation was the final religious issue dealt
with by the Montgelas' government.

Thanks in large part to

Christopher von Aretin's benevolent appeals for universal
emancipation, Jewish rights began to receive increased
attention from the administration.

Max Joseph allowed

Aretin to publicly announce, September 6, 1809, that "we
have resolved... upon the goal of leading back the numberous
class of Jewish inhabitants of our kingdom from the harmful
serpation in which they live apart from other citizens...."
Though prejudice toward Jews remained too strong for full
implemenation of Aretin's liberal ideas, royal legislation
did grant many changes.

On March 16, 1808, the leibzoll,

the annual 20-florin per family tax administered only upon
Jews, was formally lifted.40

The first Organic Law in 1809

39

Ibid. , 131-132, 292; Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 124.

40

Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 139.

116

guaranteed their religious rights would not be subject to
interference if kept private.

It was not until the second

Organic Law, June 10, 1813, that reforms on their behalf
were formally codified.
The 1813 act established Jewish rights as citizens in
respect to duties to state;

concerning rights and

privileges they were still only "partial" citizens.

Their

numbers were limited; no further immigration would be
permitted. Their existence, though nominally no longer
confined to ghettoes, was restricted to their current
residences.

Marriage was only allowed if the Jewish

population did not exceed present numbers and if the husband
could support a family without resorting to "petty trades."41
These reforms would be the limit of Bavarian reforms on
their behalf.

Viewed as an ethnic anomoly by the Bavarian

people, they were regarded with too much animosity to be
allowed further freedoms.

Herein can be seen a major

limitation of Montgelas' reforms.

His own moderate

enthusiasm for Jewish emancipation was insufficient to
overcome his fear of popular recriminations limited his
amity toward the Jews.

41
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Christopher von Aretin, much less might have been
accomplished.
During this period education, no longer the sole domain
of the church, underwent its own revolution, though not to
great success.

The clergy having been eliminated it still

remained for the state to find a better substitute.
Bavaria's approach to the subject was decidedly bourgeoisie,
leaning heavily on higher education in an attempt to
parallel the great German universities of the north.

A

great many noteworthy names were summoned or lured to
Bavaria.

Karl von Savigny arrived at the University of

Landshut in 1808 to lecture on Roman law.

Frederick

Theirsch commanded one of Father Jahn's gymansiums in
Munich, becoming a member of the Academy of Science in 1809,
over which the enlightened F.H. Jacobi presided.
Feuerbach also taught at Landshut.42

Anselm von

These men lent great

prestige to the upper echelon of Bavarian education.
Yet it was among the poor and middle class that
education reform needed the greatest assistance.

Friedrich

Niethammer assumed the post of state commissioner of
education, heading the zentralschulrat under Montgelas'
Ministry of the Interior.

He and his good friend, the

philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, who taught high school in the

42
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newly acquired town of Bamberg, attempted to reform lower
education in a progressive manner.
the state was against them.

On every level it seemed

Other concerns drained the

lifeblood of education, finances, and simply too little
money was earmarked for local schools.

Funds accumulated

from the sale of church lands was supposed to go to the
Central School Fund in Munich, but only 110,000 gulden made
it that far, the rest being
needs.43

diverted toward other pressing

Hegel voiced concern his discovery that:

...funding for the schools is thus also
chronically deficient...the minute one requests
something for it, the hue and cry goes out that the
insufficiency is due to advances from the education
fund to support the clergy. Immediate needs have been
taken care of from available means...
The same letter also reveals that, despite Montgelas'
sincere attempts to ensure the smooth operation of his new
bureaucracy, at times the cogs jammed:
You will not have been exactly surprised at our
dawdling in regard to the public school system, since
you know in general that you have had to deal first
with the people of Nuremburg, second with civil
authorities and clergy, and third with people who for
five years have grown accustomed to being inactive, who
are surprised that something is indeed to be done.44
Little headway was made.

Ironically, it would be

church-sponsored Sunday Schools, established primarily by

43

Lee, Population Growth, 346. Hegel believed the
amount to be 300,000 florins, Hegel to Niethammer, August
29, 1807, Hegel: The Letters, 141.
44

Hegel to Niethammer, Easter Day, April 10, 1814,
Hegel: The Letters, 303-304.

119

the Protestants, which would unintentionally help lower the
illiteracy rate.

These schools were intended as secondary

education for boys between the ages of twelve and eighteen
who wished to enter into trades.45

In the course of the

religious and professional training, these apprentices were
taught to read and write.
reform was a failure.

In all, Montgelas education

Too little funding and too much focus

on embellishing the Academy of Science and the Universities
left many Bavarians unable to read.

Consequently crime,

vagrancy, and begging continued to be great concerns.
In attempting to diminish these crimes, Montgelas court
system failed on one major point: patrimonial, hereditary
justice.

Landowners, still favored by the backward system

of feudal peasantry, continued to administer justice on
their own terms.

This victory was their greatest against

Montgelas and they were not about to relinquish their
rights.

Crown funds were also inadequate to erect a

definitive judicial system.46

The groundbreaking work of the

electoral period was completely renovated January 1, 1809,
by the Untergerichte, a tribunal which included urban
courts, seigneurial courts, the appelationsgerichte or
appeal court, and, as the highest body, the cour de
cassation which replaced the old appeal courts in Munich,
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Bamberg, and Ulm.47

Though an expedient measure, the

seigneurial courts in particular failed.

The Untergericht

never supplanted the the power of patrimonial justice.
The crowning achievement for Montgelas during this
period of consolidation and codification was the
Constitution of 1808.

Roughly based on the constitution of

Jerome Bonaparte's Westphalia, the Bavarian charter was not
an altogether new document; rather, like most of the work
done in these years, it was a codification and
clarification.

Many of the reforms during the electoral

period grew out of unwritten proclamations or hasty edicts.
It was time to regroup, to solidify the admirable
workmanship of the first nine years.
made a constitution necessary.

Other factors, too,

As in the case of justice,

the nobles had recovered from their initial shock and were
beginning to oppose reform more firmly.

As was the general

trend in European states during these years, the upper class
was beginning its counter-assault, the reaction against
revolution.
an attack.

To codify the laws would aid in weakening such
A constitution would give the government a firm

foundation from which to argue their point.48

It would also

help quell fears of radical revolution by giving a semblance
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of order.

Bavaria had not experienced a bloody revolution

as France had, but the fear of Jacobin clubs and secret
societies was common among both the bourgeoisie and the
nobility.

Therefore both the reformers and their opposition

would benefit.

There was more to come. In addition, fear of

Dalberg's potential strength as "Prince-Primate" moved the
Bavarians to proceed with the drafting of the first minor
state constitution during the Napoleonic Wars. Dalberg had
presented plans for a confederation-constitution.

Max

Joseph and Montgelas wanted no part of such political body.49
The Constitution of 1808 was thus preemptive, showing that
Bavaria could stand alone and did not need the confederation
to legitimize her existence as a kingdom.
As with most of these reforms, the Constitution of 1808
was at first a royal edict issued May 1, 1808, later
published May 25.50

It firmly established Max Joseph as an

enlightened despot.

In the interests of democracy and the

rights of man it was declared that all Bavarian citizens
were guaranteed freedom of conscience and security of person
and property.
only in theory.

The Constitution was, however, democratic
Franchise was extended only to those nobles

49
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and bourgeois landowners paying the highest taxes, chosen as
electors for life by the king.

They would elect members

from each administrative kreise to sit with representatives
hand-picked by the "governors" in a unicameral legislature.
Each "representative" would serve a six-year term.

This

body could enact legislation which was always subject to
scrutiny by the king and his ministers.

Mostly, like the

conseil d'etat before it, debate was their primary concern,
concentrating on the budget and finances.

Max Joseph could

assemble, dismiss, or dissove the body at will.51
Uniformity, centralization, and codification were the
key points.

All prior legislation concerning conscription,

draft exemptions, taxation, administrative kreise, the
staatskonferenz, conseil d'etat, and generallandesdirektion
were made permanent.

The ministries of finance, foreign

affairs, and the interior were to be reorganized into
distinct bureaus, each with one head, responsible for all
activities of his section.

All privileges, noble and

clerical, were formally abolished, as were the Imperial
estates to which they formerly belonged.

The judiciary was

made independant of the legislature and not subject to its
direction, though it was responsible to the king and the
staatskonferenz. Each judge was to be named by the current
monarch and were responsible to direct the police in

51

Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 73.
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arrests, fines, and prison terms.

The Constitution

established for the royal succession, coming of age, and
marriage of royal family members.
also declared.

Freedom of the press was

All were subject to "la prerogative

royal e.1,52
Bavaria's first constitution was a sincere, somewhat
awkward effort to reach the upper classes disrupted by nine
years of rapid reorganization.

"Allerdings hatte sie im

Unterschied zur Konstitution von 1808 weniger den Charakter
der Erneuerung als den des Ausgleichs," writes Karl Mockl.53
It did nothing, however, to truly emancipate the agrarian
peasants still languishing under feudal bonds.

It also

failed to institute a firm penal code; this would remain a
problem until Anselm Feuerbach wrote a workable system in
1813.54

In time, demands of the resurgent and victorious

allies would call for the resignation of Montgelas as
incompatible with the reaction against reform and
rationalism.

It would simultaneously require a new

constitution in 1818 to preserve Bavaria's existence in the
reactionary Metternich order.

For the Napoleonic empire,

however, it was an honest attempt at enlightened rule.

52

Montgelas, Compte Rendu, 70-75.

53

Mockl, "Die bayerische Konstitution von 1808," 166.

54

Ramm, Germany, 77.
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By 1812 the revolution was complete.
accomplish?

What did it

It was not the "total revolution" declared by

Anselm Feuerbach; in some areas it fell far short of its
goals.

In many respects, Montgelas' goal was outmoded

before it was finished, for the time of the absolute monarch
in Europe was at an end.

The disillusionment of Feuerbach

and others from the allure of the French Empire, accelerated
by the 1812 debacle, represented a fundamental change that
would result, within a year, in Max Joseph's revolt from the
Napoleonic hegemony.

An analysis of Montgelas' program in

long-term European history will reveal a great deal about
its importance and its faults.

Conclusion

As Napoleon's rise had aided Montgelas in the
realization of his plans, so was the Savoyard minister's
destiny interwoven with the fall of the French conqueror.
After the 1812 debacle, when over 30,000 young Bavarians
died in the snows of Russia, public opinion turned against
France.

Max Joseph's support, also so very crucial to

Montgelas, began to waver.
invincible.

He saw that Napoleon was not

The tide which had been continually washing out

of France since 1796 began to turn.

I
The End of the Napoleonic Hegemony

Much has been said of the so-called War of Liberation
that ensued.

The 1813 campaign with its titanic culmination

at Leipzig has been hailed by Treitschke and others as the
awakening of the German spirit.

Philosophers and historians

alike debated the influence of Fichte, Herder, Miiller and
others.

Some, like Hans Kohn and Freiderick Meinecke, have

developed their theories on nationalism around the words of
such men,

proclaiming that it was the work of Fichte and

Goethe that caused Germany to suddenly (and consciously)
realize its possible future.1

But all in all it was

:

Hans Kohn's detailed works on nationalism during this
period are constantly skewed by his desire to make something
125
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political reality and not the fervor of the masses that led
Max Joseph and the other monarchs of the Confederation of
the Rhine to defect to the allies as surely as they had
joined France in 1805.
Napoleon's fall revealed the Confederation as the paper
tiger it truly was.

German fervor for French ideology had

long since lost its initial luster;

during the spring of

1813 it was becoming clear that an annulment of the FrancoBavarian alliance was in sight.

The people began to murmur

that the price paid in Bavarian lives for French
"protection" was far too high.

Indeed, the newly

reconstituted Bavarian divisions which rejoined Napoleon in
March and April exhibited much less zeal than their
predecessors.
Montgelas' own position within the government was
becoming tenuous. General von Wrede, never a supporter of
Napoleon, began to advocate negotiation with Prussia and
out of nothing. It is fairly obvious from contemporary
accounts that the philosophers and romantics of the
preceding twenty years had a much smaller effect than Kohn
would like to admit. Nonetheless, his works are an
insightful study into the ideas of Fichte, Herder, the
brothers Schlegel, and others. See Hans Kohn, Prelude to
Nation-states: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815,
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.) 1967; Hughes,
Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945, 1988, and
Freidrich Meinecke, The Age of German Liberalism, 1795-1815,
(Berkeley: University of California Press) 1957. For an
excellent and oft-overlooked refutation of the Kohn and
Meinecke theses, see Robert M. Berdahl, "New Thoughts on
German Nationalism," American Historical Review, vol. 77,
no. 1, 1972, pp. 65-80. Berdahl attacks the idea of German
intellectual culture forming national consciousness in the
absence of real, political action.

127

Russia, joined later that summer by a resurgent Austria.
Montgelas, however, was unsure that path was the correct
one.

His memoirs fall silent on this point; it is difficult

to ascertain whether Montgelas was acting in the hopes of
simple political survival or for the welfare of the state.
He believed, as did most of his supporters, that the return
of Austrian power would spell disaster for his reforms.
Never as popular as his sovereign, Montgelas suffered under
the attacks of his detractors, particularly from the exiled
embezzler Karl von Reisach, who, under the approving eye of
Baron Stein penned a vehement pamphlet condemning the new
aristocracy in Munich.2

This vituperation struck a chord

with the landed gentry and former reichsritterschaft, ever
anxious to hamper Montgelas in any way.

As the summer

wore on and Napoleon failed to achieve the decisive
"thunderclap,"

Wrede and others increasingly called on Max

Joseph to sever the Gallic ties and return to an
understanding with Austria.

Early in October, while

Montgelas hesitated and fretted in Munich, Wrede forced the
king's hand and the Bavarian troops received orders to join
the Allies. Max Joseph had come to terms with the Prussian
minister Hardenberg, who had agreed to allow Bavaria to
retain her possessions.

The threat of Austrian invasion,

real or imagined, had been too great to ignore.

2

Just as

Klang, Bavaria and the War of Liberation, 30.
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with its conception, the Confederation of the Rhine lived or
died not by the will of Bonaparte alone, but with the
loyalty of the Bavarian crown.

At the time of the "Battle

of the Nations," at Leipzig, October 16-18, 1813, only
Saxony remained a French satellite, the other states having
made separate agreements with the Allies.
It seems that the decision to defect was taken by those
in the highest levels of government, in the court and
palace, in the conseil d'etat and the provincial bureaus.
As they had so often proved in the years since Max Joseph's
accession, the commoners of Bavaria remained on the whole
impassive bystanders.

There had been no popular outcry for

reform in 1799; it had been directed by and desired wholly
by the upper middle class.

The same could be said of 1813;

the movement had come mostly from above.

Despite what

Treitschke and others would believe, there was no popular
outcry.

The prolific Hegel remarked when the "liberators"

passed by "...if par hasard there are any liberated
individuals to be seen, I myself will stand up and watch!"3
Reaction ranged from moderation to coolness.
The next years saw Bavaria survive, due more to
Prussian fear of a Austria than to the power of the
Wittelsbach throne.
survive.

3

Montgelas, however, did not long

His cool reception of the "liberators" was known

Hegel, The Letters, 291.
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throughout the country, and after 1814 the men who aided in
the defection of Bavaria were most in favor.
became too much;

The pressures

with the best of his ministers dead and

his unofficial French patron overthrown, Montgelas remaining
time was short.

In 1817, claiming ill-health, he resigned

from his position, though he remained an inactive advisor to
his friend the king for several years.

The following year,

1818, marked the passage of Bavaria's second constitution,
the first liberal constitution in Germany, granting a
measure of democracy, including popular elections and rights
for peasants, freedoms that Montgelas' codification of 1808
never even envisioned.

II
Bavaria and the Napoleonic Empire

European historians have labelled the German states
during the Napoleonic era as "victims."

That label holds

true particularly in the loss of young lives on the
battlefield, lost in wars their sovereigns had no choice but
to join.
Bavaria's case is different.

Though she had little say

in the greater sphere of European politics, her large size
and considerable population gave her leverage in the
struggle.

States such as Kleves-Berg or Hesse-Darmstadt had

meager resources, and thus their victimization gained them
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nothing.

In the end, these states lost the paltry

independence their scarce resources gave them, consumed in
the Germany of the early 19th Century, dominated by growing
Prussia and waning Austria.

But Bavaria's assets meant her

ruler could negotiate the terms of his service, a fact that
is overlooked in many histories of the period.

Napoleon

needed a Bavarian corps in his army, but Max Joseph
benefited more from this arrangement;

when the Austrians

returned in 1813, he now had a sizable, organized military
force the Hapsburgs could ill afford to fight.

It must not

be overemphasized, but Bavaria's new-found military strength
played a definite role in her survival during the Age of
Metternich.
Likewise, the Bavaria of Napoleonic Europe finally
entered the industrial age.

Along with the rest of Germany,

Bavarian industry flourished in the next decades.

The pre-

conditions for this explosion exist in Montgelas' reform of
the bureaucratic and social systems of the state, allowing
for the immigration of Protestant entrepreneurs and removing
the boundaries to economic growth.

Napoleon's Anglophobic

trade war fueled the initial drive, forcing the Bavarian
industry into competition with the other German states and
Northern Italy, and, with her large pool of unemployed
manpower and larger resources to draw upon, Bavaria was able
to turn Britain's short-term exclusion from the Rhine and
Danube into its gain.
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The question remains; to whom does the credit go?
Certainly it has been made clear that the conditions for
reform existed before Austria's debacle at Ulm in 1805,
which brought the French to Munich to stay for some time.
But it is also apparent that without the protective umbrella
of French power Bavaria could not have stood up to the
Reich.

Without the dismantling of the entangling

obligations and authority of the Holy Roman Empire,
Montgelas could not have consolidated his lord's holdings
and reunited isolated Bavarian possessions.

It is not too

bold to state that without the ideas of the French
Revolution, Bavaria could not have moved in the direction it
did.

The reactionary policy taken by Max Joseph smiled

favorably upon the small kingdom.
Bavaria's story also does much to refute the role of
nationalism during these years.

To many citizens of Munich,

Ulm, and Augsburg, Bavaria was the only Germany they ever
knew--as illustrated in the conversation between a father
and his liberal son in the poet Heinrich von Kleist's
Germania.
"Tell me child, who are you?"
"A German."
"A German? You are joking. You were born in
Meissen, and the country to which Meissen belongs is
called Saxony!"
"I was born in Meissen and the country to which
Meissen belongs is called Saxony, but my fatherland,
the country to which Saxony belongs, is Germany, and
your son, my father, is a German."
"You dream. I do not know any country to which
Saxony belongs, unless perhaps the Rhenish
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Confederation. Where can I find this Germany of which
you talk; where is it situated?"4
The "revolution" in Bavaria was a decidedly bourgeoisie
event.

In general, the populace displayed an overly passive

response to Montgelas' reforms, exhibiting little of the
fervor described by German nationalist historians of the
later 19th Century.

Since this is so, the men who led

Bavaria into the French hegemony and then those who helped
lead it back into the allied camp were upper middle class,
the 19th-century novus homo of the German states.

Most of

the intellectuals whom Treitschke and others credited with
leading the patriotic drive toward
the Bavarian reformers.

unity did not appeal to

Fichte, considered to be weak on

history and economy, believed international trade was
dangerous and entangling, to be avoided until the state had
completely exploited its own resources.5

Friedrich

Schlegel's cultural nationalism was completely unconcerned
with the concept of state, central to Montgelas' ideas.6
And one of the foremost of the Romantic political
philosophers, Adam Miiller rejected capitalism altogether as
antisocial and unethical, unequivocally rejecting all

4

Heinrich von Kleist, Germania, translated in Kohn,
Prelude to Nation-States, 197.
5

H.T. Betteridge, "Fichte's Political Ideas: A
Retrospect," German Life and Letters, vol. I, 1936-1937,
295 .
6

Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States, 180-181.
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reformers who wanted to throw away traditions such as those
embodied by the Reich.

If indeed the measure of Bavaria's

nationalism lies in the hearts of the new leaders of the
southern German state, then the intellectuals of the early
century certainly shared little of their traits.
Bavaria's revolution, then, belongs to Bavaria alone.
Credit for the change can not only be given to Napoleon, who
tore away the phantom chains of the Holy Roman Empire, but
also to Montgelas and Max Joseph, the former for being a man
of vision and energy and the other for having the good
fortune of being a man with extraordinary political luck.
Standing alone, in its most restricted sense, their story
epitomizes the nature of change coming not only in Munich
but in Vienna, Berlin, and all the German capitals.

In a

much larger scope, it is an oft-overlooked part of Germany's
history in the early 19th-century and deserves to be
explored, not as a footnote to the rise of the unified
German state or as a minor satellite of the vast Napoleonic
dynasty but as an interesting and illuminating glimpse into
the fundamental changes that would help to lead Germany into
the modern world.
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